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Can law create trust? Can law make people more trustworthy? These are some
of the questions posed by scholars across the political spectrum interested in the
impact of law on society. There is no shortage of arguments on both sides of these
questions: that law can be a tool for promoting trust, or destroying it. This Article is
an attempt to address these questions through an analysis of a single market, to
explore the interplay between law and trust in a situation of abject market failure: the
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. It possible that as many as three
million American homeowners will lose their homes to foreclosure over the coming
years, and the subprime mortgage crisis has spilled over into many other areas of the
market, resulting in a global credit crunch and likely spurring a deep recession.
This analysis will look to the roots of this crisis to determine the extent to which
aspects of trust, cooperation and mutual interdependence were lacking. As the
following discussion shows, asymmetry of information and inadequate legal
protections created market incentives that led to the collapse of this sector. The
worst abuses of the subprime market came about because of a breakdown of
economic relationships that were, in the past, bound by trust and mutual
interdependence. In addition, deregulation, the lasting impact of mortgage lending
discrimination and the fact that much subprime lending took place outside the scope
of some of the laws designed to combat discrimination in mortgage lending, all
resulted in a dramatic increase in subprime lending in previously underserved
communities, and this increase disproportionately impacted communities of color.
This Article makes the case for the need for legal protections in markets that
change: those that transform from a situation where trust is high and informal
mechanisms of enforcing trust are effective, to one where such informal mechanisms
are no longer useful. Furthermore, this analysis also concludes that the legal
framework in place to prevent discrimination in the mortgage market was illequipped to deal with reverse redlining—the concentration of subprime mortgage
products in, and the targeting by subprime lenders of, previously underserved
African-American and Latino communities. Thus, the legal regime in place—or,
more accurately, the absence of legal protections—created a legal vacuum where
abuse of trust could thrive.
The home mortgage market in its traditional form, and when it worked well, was
one in which personal relationships between parties involved in the transaction could
trust one another and were constrained by laws created to combat discriminatory
denials of credit. When this market experienced a radical transformation, and these
personal relationships gave way to more impersonal transactions, the law has proven
slow to respond. I submit that responses to the changes to the market should attempt
to take into account the extent to which the market might have functioned well in its
high trust incarnation and try to recreate and build trust on a larger scale. With the
advance of globalization, and the transition of many economic markets, such insights
might help in guiding markets to adopt legal protections that might incorporate the
ways that laws can foster trust and promote economic growth.
Through this analysis, I will utilize the concept of social capital—defined as
“social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness”1—and
analyze the subprime mortgage crisis in an effort to explore the ways that laws and

1

Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first
Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137 (2007).
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legal institutions can foster, promote, discourage and decrease trust, trusting behavior
and trustworthiness.
Initially, I will introduce the concept of social capital, as it has been defined by
sociologists, historians, legal scholars and economists, and provide an overview of
the arguments concerning the effects of law on trust and social capital. I will then
provide a history of the subprime mortgage crisis and examine some of the key
facets of the market that created the conditions necessary for its collapse, looking
specifically at the following: (1) the relationship between the borrower, mortgage
broker and lender and the incentives created by the mortgage securities market; (2)
the asymmetries of information that pervade these relationships; (3) the terms of the
mortgage and subsequent security agreements and the likelihood that borrowers in
default might enjoy relief from foreclosure. After this analysis, I will review the
extent to which changes in the legal and regulatory framework failed to take into
account the role that social capital plays in the mortgage market and whether legal
institutions in place are adequate to respond to the collapse of the market and the
lasting impact of discrimination in that market. I will then propose responses to the
causes for the subprime mortgage crisis that take into account the role that social
capital can play in mortgage finance transactions and analyze the extent to which
these proposals might strengthen this market at present and into the future.
I. LAWS, NORMS OF TRUST AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
It is now well recognized that the norms and networks that develop as a result of
interactions within civil society—i.e., that sphere of human interaction that is
separate from the state—can have a distinct value for creating trust and
trustworthiness. For the purposes of this Article, I will join others in describing
these norms and networks, collectively, as “social capital.” Driven by norms of trust,
shared interests and generalized reciprocity, social capital plays a critical role in
ensuring that neighborhoods, markets, communities and nations function well and
efficiently.2
The relative presence or strength of social capital can mean the difference
between a well-functioning society and one that is riddled by corruption, crime, low
levels of civic participation and high levels of mistrust of neighbors, civic
institutions, and elected officials. Research shows that in communities where social
capital is high, the residents of those communities are healthier, wealthier, happier,
and feel stronger bonds to their neighbors in particular and their communities in
general.3
For the purposes of this Article, I will borrow the definition articulated earlier,
and will use the term social capital to refer to “social networks and the associated
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.”4 Such networks and norms help to
2
See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000); ROBERT C. SOLOMON & FERNANDO FLORES, BUILDING
TRUST: IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND LIFE 20 (2001).
3

See, e.g., Michael Woolcock, The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and
Economic Outcomes, 2 CANADIAN J. OF POL’Y RESEARCH 1, 5 (2001), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/13/1824913.pdf (compiling studies of the developing world).
4

See Putnam, supra note 1. See also Deepa Narayan, Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital
and Poverty 6 (World Bank Poverty Group, Working Paper, 1999) (“[S]ocial capital is defined
as the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of society that enable
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overcome collective action problems in several ways. First, they facilitate feelings
of obligation to other members of a network and lead to expectations of certain
conduct between such members. Second, they help to promote the flow of
information, to overcome information asymmetries, including answering the
question “who can be trusted.” Third, they convey a set of norms that carry
sanctions for violation of such norms.5
In these ways, social capital facilitates communication and exchange between
individuals. When individuals are able to engage in conduct that furthers their
mutually beneficial ends they are able to build a trusting relationship that facilitates
mutually beneficial conduct in the future, with fewer costs associated with
monitoring the behavior of those participating in the activity and searching for
adequate partners for collective action. These relationships are constrained by the
threat of many different types of sanctions that might discourage predatory conduct
and encourage a receptivity and penchant for future collective activity. Such
sanctions can result in harm to reputation and shunning, to more formal punishment,
administered by the state.
As a number of commentators have noted, “life is easier” when the presence of
social capital is high in a community.6 As Robert Putnam explains:
In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of
generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such
networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations,
and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. When
economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense networks of
social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced. At the same
time, networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration,
which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally,
dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of
self, developing the "I" into the "we," or . . . enhancing the participants'
"taste" for collective benefits.7
Social capital can be found in the relations between two neighbors; in the
collective activity of a neighborhood association; in business transactions; in the
communications between the constituents of a national, membership organization. It
can even be virtual, found in an internet chat room or affinity group. In sum, social
people to co-ordinate action and to achieve desired goals.”). See also Woolcock, supra note 3,
at 9 (“[S]ocial capital refers to the norms and networks that facilitate collective action.”).
5

James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J.
(SUPP.) S95, S119 (1988).

OF

SOC.

6
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, Revisited, 5 THE RESPONSIVE CMTY. 18, 20 (1995);
Jason Mazzone, Towards A Social Capital Theory of Law: Lessons from Collaborative
Reproduction, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
7

Putnam, supra note 6, at 20. See also Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After
All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT REV. 393, 394 (1998) (“There is
agreement that trust is important in a number of ways: it enables cooperative behavior;
promotes adaptive organizational forms, such as network relations; reduces harmful conflict;
decreases transaction costs; facilitates rapid formulation of ad hoc work groups; and promotes
effective responses to crisis.”) (citations omitted).
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capital “commonly refers to the stocks of social trust, norms, and networks that
people can draw upon in order to solve common problems.”8 Indeed, some level of
social capital and trust is necessary for many forms of human interactions, collective
action and the promotion of collective interests, especially economic endeavors.9
Norms of trust flourish, and are typically present, in the relations between
individuals in, and the activities of, voluntary networks and associations:
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital
refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections
among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely
related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that
‘social capital’ calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful
when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. A
society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in
social capital.10
There are two types of social capital. The first, “bonding” social capital, refers to
the norms of reciprocity and trust that develop within a closely knit group that help
facilitate information sharing, mutual support and collective action. The second,
“bridging” social capital, helps facilitate connections between individuals in different
networks, and facilitates information sharing and economic exchange across
different closely knit associations.11 The two types of social capital have also been
8
Robert E. Lang & Steven P. Hornburg, What is Social Capital and Why Is It Important to
Public Policy?, 9 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 1, 4 (1998).
9

See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972)
(“Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”)
(citation omitted). It seems hard to imagine walking out one’s door without engaging in a
great deal of trust just to get through the morning. The train or subway operator, the bus
driver, the car manufacturer, the coffee vender and muffin purveyor all are actors in whose
hands we place our lives every day in the belief they will not drive off the rails or road, not
assemble defectively, and not poison us. See also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL
VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 151-152 (1995) (arguing that a basic level of trust
that permits day-to-day activities is likely “a matter of habit” that is “fairly widespread”
throughout society).
10
PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 19. As one early proponent of the concept of social capital
asserts: “Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations
between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in
physical implements of production.” Coleman, supra note 5, at S98.
11
PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 22. Putnam goes on to explain that bonding social capital is
“inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups.” Id. at
22. Bridging social capital tends to be “outward looking and encompass[es] people across
diverse social cleavages.” Id. “Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide
crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community, while
furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labor for local entrepreneurs. Bridging
networks, by contrast, are better for linkages to external assets and for information diffusion.”
Id. See also Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer, Understanding and Measuring
Social Capital: A Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

5

276

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:271

described, by Xavier de Souza Briggs, respectively, as, first, “social support”, which
“helps one ‘get by’ or cope,” the forms of which “might include being able to get a
ride, confide in someone, or obtain a small cash loan in an emergency”; and, second,
as “social leverage,” which “helps one ‘get ahead’ or change one’s opportunity set
through access to job information, say, or a recommendation for a scholarship or
loan.”12 A critical component of bridging social capital is the ability of individuals
and networks to move beyond closer bonds, and share information and ideas across
otherwise insular networks.13 A failure on the part of an insular group to recognize
the need for bridging beyond its members’ particular characteristics to create broader
networks of trust represents the “dark side” of social capital: when bonding social
capital produces negative consequences for the larger community, which is present
in such groups as the Ku Klux Klan or an organized crime “family.”14
Initiative 16 (World Bank Soc. Cap. Initiative, Working Paper No. 24, 2001); ROSS GITTELL &
AVIS VIDAL, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING: BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY 10 (1998) (describing forms of social capital).
12
Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility and the Many
Faces of Social Capital, 9 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 177, 178 (1998) (citations omitted). See also
Woolcock, supra note 3, at 10 (“[Bonding social capital] refers to relations between family
members, close friends, and neighbors, . . . [bridging social capital refers to] more distant
friends, associates, and colleagues.”).
13

See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY 117-28 (2001). The differences between these two forms of social capital can be
subtle, but both forms can be mutually reinforcing. In one study of U.S.-based
microenterprise programs that focused on building both bonding and bridging capital,
borrowers were able to form relationships with other borrowers that increased networking
opportunities and helped build self-esteem and increased marketing and information-sharing
among the borrowers (an example of bonding social capital at work). At the same time, these
strong networks were also able to make connections with other organizations, lenders and
government entities, to improve economic opportunities for their members (an example of
bridging social capital). Lisa J. Servon, Credit and Social Capital: The Community
Development Potential of U.S. Microenterprise Programs, 9 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 115, 11945 (1998).
14

See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 2, at 340 (describing negative consequences of some forms
of social capital); Nat J. Colletta & Michelle L. Cullen, The Nexus Between Violent Conflict,
Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda, (World Bank
Soc. Cap. Initiative, Working Paper No. 23, 2000) (describing negative effects of bonding
social capital in Rwandan genocide). Given the potential negative externalities associated
with associational activity, some scholarship has focused less on associational activity and
more on the role of trust and trusting behavior for improving economic conditions. See, e.g.,
Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A CrossCountry Investigation, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1251, 1271-1274 (1997) (arguing that associational
activity that involves homogenous actors engaged in self-interested, rent-seeking activities can
reduce levels of trust in a society); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); Stephen Knack, Address
at the HRDC-OECD International Symposium on the Contribution of Investment in Human
and Social Capital to Sustained Economic Growth and Well Being: Trust, Associational Life
and Economic Performance 1, 31-32 (Mar. 19, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/6/31/1825662.pdf (arguing that “high radius trust” is more closely linked to
economic growth than associational activity) [hereinafter Knack, Trust]; Michael P. Claibourn
& Paul S. Martin, Trusting and Joining? An Empirical Test of the Reciprocal Nature of Social
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Communities with a history of civic activism that are high in social capital have
been shown to have highly effective governments.15 To the extent that social capital
thrives in the activity of civic associations, social capital can be enhanced by laws
that promote civic participation, like a legal tradition that promotes free speech,
freedom of association and freedom of religion. In these ways, the concept of social
capital takes into account “the most formalized institutional relationships and
structures, such as government, the political regime, the rule of law, the court
system, and civil and political liberties.”16 When social capital takes this form—
when it “facilitates mutually beneficial collective action through established roles
and social networks supplemented by rules, procedures, and precedents”—it is often
referred to as “structural” social capital, which is to be distinguished from
“cognitive” social capital, “which includes shared norms, values, attitudes, and
beliefs, [which] predisposes people toward mutually beneficial collective action.”17
There is an obvious interplay between the cognitive aspects of social capital and
its structural elements, particularly with respect to the extent to which a given
individual will engage in trusting behavior of another. An individual’s willingness to
trust, that is, to engage in an “optimistic acceptance of a vulnerable situation in
which the trustor believes the trustee will care for the trustor’s interests,”18 will
depend on a range of factors, including the extent to which one’s trust will not be
abused, that one will not be in a worse off position because of such trust. This
calculation will be a function of many factors, including the trustor’s experience with
trusting generally, the knowledge the trustor has about the foreseeable conduct of the
trusted, and whether the trusted feels sufficiently protected from the downside risk of
trusting, i.e., the nature and effectiveness of the sanctions for breach of trust that are
available. While a mountain of research exists concerning individual’s likelihood to
trust, often tested in classic “prisoner’s dilemma” games,19 an exploration of this
Capital, 22 POL. BEHAV. 267 (2000) (finding little correlation between associational activity
and trust); PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC PHOENIX: REINVENTING POLITICAL ACTIVISM 153-156
(2002) (conducting cross-country analysis and linking economic growth to trust and not
associational behavior).
15

See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY (1993); Coleman, supra note 5, at S105-S108. Cross-country studies have
established a high correlation between levels of trust in society and effective government. See,
e.g., Rafael LaPorta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.
333 (1997) (conducting cross-country analysis and finding higher levels of trust consistent
with better functioning governments); Knack & Keefer, supra note 14, at 1275-1277; Stephen
Knack, Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States, 46 AM. J. OF
POL. SCI. 772 (2002) (finding opinions of government performance higher in states within the
United States where social capital was higher).
16

Thierry van Bastelaer, Imperfect Information, Social Capital and the Poor’s Access to
Credit 6 (World Bank Soc. Cap. Initiative, Working Paper No. 234, 2000).
17

Anirudh Krishna & Norma Uphoff, Mapping and Measuring Social Capital Through
Assessment of Collective Action to Conserve and Develop Watersheds in Rajasthan, India, in
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPTIAL IN DEVELOPMENT 85, 87 (Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van
Bastelaer eds., 2002).
18

Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 (2002).

19

In a survey of research concerning prisoner’s dilemma games, Professors Blair and Stout
identify common themes from these studies, including that individuals are not always strictly
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literature is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I will focus on the so-called
structural aspects of this calculation, which brings us back to the questions first
posed in this piece: can the law create trust and can it make people more
trustworthy?
There is a growing body of literature that is now looking at the extent to which
social capital theory can inform our understanding of how laws and the legal system
can promote trust,20 how laws can weaken or strengthen social capital,21 and how
social capital theory can even serve as an aid in constitutional interpretation.22
Some argue that laws remove the incentives for individuals and communities to
work together to overcome collective action problems.23 A community that is selfindividualistic and self interested, that individuals vary in their willingness to trust, and that
economic incentives can influence an individual’s willingness to trust. See Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1741-1742 (2001) (summarizing research) (citations omitted). See
also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (describing prisoner’s
dilemma theory and outcomes of prisoner’s dilemma games); David Sally, Conversation and
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958-1992, 7
RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58 (1995) (summarizing findings from prisoner’s dilemma studies).
20
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996)
(assessing impact of law on development of social norms); Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93
GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005) (assessing legal system’s ability to foster trust and increase positive
social capital); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive
Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1041 (1999) (“An expressive function may, in fact, be
the most significant one that courts perform"); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (analyzing extent to
which law can strengthen or erode societal norms). Cf. Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 495 (2001) (arguing trust is not a resource that can serve as a form of social capital).
21
Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2055 (1996) (analyzing extent to which laws can erode conditions necessary for social capital
to flourish); Jason Mazzone, Towards a Social Capital Theory of Law: Lessons from
Collaborative Reproduction, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing for analysis of
family law from the perspective of promoting social capital); Asmara Tekle Johnson,
Correcting for Kelo: Social Capital Impact Assessments and the Re-Balancing of Power
Between “Desperate” Cities, Corporate Interests and the Average Joe, 16 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 187 (2006) (arguing for social capital impact assessment of eminent domain
actions); Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 529 (2006) (analyzing impact of land use law on social capital
formation).
22
Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J.
27 (2001) (analyzing extent to which federalism in the constitutional structure of the United
States promotes social capital).
23
For analysis that sees the rise of the law and lawyers as eroding trust, see, e.g.,
FUKUYAMA, supra note 9, at 309-311 (arguing that trust has been displaced by legalistic
approaches to societal disputes that are less effective and efficient); MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that adherence
to the absolute protection of individual rights undermines creation of community of shared
interests); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987). Some scholars point
to the phenomenon that excessive control through regulation and oversight can lead to a
reduction in trust and trusting behavior, as the trusting become pre-occupied with controls and
regulating the acts of the trusted, and the trusted (or not so trusted) feel they are not trusted
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regulating, with swift punishment for offenders of the common interest, enjoys more
efficient activities and outcomes, with infrequent resort to the courts and legal
system, which would otherwise carry with them high transactions costs.24 Others
posit that laws and regulations, when focused on protecting individual rights over
communitarian sensibilities, create a fractured society that emphasizes difference
over shared histories and interests.25 Theorists who believe law weakens trust argue
that countries with higher rates of trust in the aggregate have greater economic
growth and better functioning democracies.26
Defenders of the role of law in promoting trust point to the role that law and
regulations can have in creating a legal “backstop” that permits trust to flourish in a
given setting, facilitating collective and beneficial action. Research shows that
functioning markets require the rule of law and an effective legal regime that honors
and enforces contracts and protects property rights.27 Similarly, formal legal
institutions can enhance trust because parties can believe that others will adhere to
their contracts and cooperation can be encouraged when agents agree to follow
professional licensing requirements and ethical codes.28 Litigation can also serve to
due to the fact that those supposedly trusting them are engaged and pre-occupied with
oversight. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 580-584 (2001)
(arguing regulation promotes opportunistic behavior that undermines trust); Sumantra Ghoshal
& Peter Moran, Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory, 21 ACAD. MGMT
REV. 13, 24 (1996) (arguing oversight reduces trusting and trustworthy behavior).
24
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (arguing that in high trust communities, transactions costs are reduced
because of recourse to informal mechanisms for resolving disputes); See Knack, Trust, supra
note 14, at 5 (arguing that costs of contract enforcement and agency monitoring is reduced in
high trust communities).
25

For the communitarian analysis of law and trust, see, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993).

OF COMMUNITY,

26
See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 9, at 7; Paul F. Whitely, Economic Growth and Social
Capital, 48 POL. STUD. 443, 455-459 (2000) (conducting a thirty-four country study to show
that economic performance is closely related to social capital); Knack & Keefer, supra note
14, at 1258-1274 (showing positive relationship between levels of trust in society and
economic growth).
27

See, e.g., Rafael LaPorta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131,
1147-49 (1997) (conducting a forty-nine country study and finding that nations with stronger
investor protections and enforcement had larger and more robust capital markets); Paul J. Zak
& Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON. J. 295, 307-16 (2001) (conducting a crosscountry analysis of forty-one nations and finding that the relative strength of formal
institutions that promote trust—like investor protections and enforceability of contracts—
relate “positively and significantly” with higher growth).
28
Knack, Trust, supra note 14, at 8. See also, Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583-84 (1990) (arguing that contract
law fosters cooperation by permitting parties to overcome suspicion); Simon Deakin et al.,
Contract Law, Trust Relations, and Incentives for Co-Operation: A Comparative Study in
CONTRACTS, CO-OPERATION AND COMPETITION: STUDIES IN ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT AND
LAW 105, 133 (Simon Deakin & Jonathan Michie eds., 1997) (conducting cross-country
analysis of firm behavior in three European countries and finding that contract law facilitates
economic activity by reducing uncertainty and complexity in business relationships).
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remedy breaches of trust, make those guilty of such breaches accountable to those
whose trust they violated, and try to restore confidence in the trusted.29
As in most things in life, however, the answers to these questions are not always
simple, one sided or definitive. There is no easy formula for determining cause and
effect. Trust can improve interactions between actors, can make government run
more efficiently, and can reduce the need for legal interventions, but effective
government and non-arbitrary enforcement of the law can also foster trust and
trusting behavior.
The relationship between trust and civic cooperation, on the one hand, and
property rights and government performance on the other, is likely to be complex,
with each influencing the other. Formal institutions can be substitutes for—as well
as causes of—trust and civic cooperation. Societies with low trust require more
robust formal institutions if they are to undertake the exchanges that are crucial to
growth.30
Research shows that trust is higher in homogenous communities where the
likelihood of repeat interactions is higher; the presence of such attributes of a society
increases the effectiveness of sanctions such as reputational harm and shunning.31 In
more heterogeneous communities, social capital is harder to develop; there the power
of trust sanctions is significantly weaker.32 In such settings, the need for greater
monitoring and stronger legal controls is apparent.33
The fall of the Soviet Union and the spread of globalization have opened up
societies and markets throughout the world to new ideas, commerce, and investment.
Communities in emerging economies recovering from state control or integrating
their economies into the world economy for the first time have proven a rich field of
study to stress the importance of social capital in economic development in such
settings.34 This research has allowed us to see the importance of social capital in
overcoming collective action problems in areas where civil society has been nonexistent (due to restraints on civil liberties), or where social capital has been strictly
insular and of the “bonding” variety.
But so-called “emerging markets” are not the only markets that are in a state of
transformation. Globalization has impacted markets even in post-industrial Western
29

For an analysis of the role of tort litigation in remedying the breaches of trust evident in
the recent sexual abuse scandals in the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, see
Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort Law, 39
CONN. L. REV. 809 (2007).
30

See, Knack & Keefer, supra note 14, at 1279, n. 34.

31

Edward L. Glaeser et al., Measuring Trust, 115 Q. J. ECON. 811, 814 (2000) (finding the
degree of social connection between individuals correlated to trusting and trustworthy
behavior).
32

Putnam, supra note 1, at 141-151, (finding the level of social capital reduced in
communities with increased heterogeneity).
33

Zak & Knack, supra note 27, at 296-98.

34

Two excellent collections of important research in this area are: ASSESSING THE VALUE
OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES (Peter Murrell ed., 2001), and ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN
DEVELOPMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT (Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer
eds., 2002).
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countries, and relationships of trust and mutual interdependence have broken down
in many areas, creating impersonal interactions where the norms and sanctions that
might facilitate more trusting behavior are ineffective.35 Jane Jacobs’s Hudson
Street, with its collection of shopkeepers, neighbors and friends, all engaged in a
dance of commerce and communication,36 have given way to gated communities,
drive-through stores and internet commerce. While emerging markets have been the
target of a great deal of research on the importance of social capital, less focus has
been placed on markets transitioning from ones dominated by local, longer term
interactions, to ones on a global stage where networks of trust are less effective in
curbing predatory conduct.
As a way to join this rich debate, it is helpful to test the different theories about
trust and social capital in previously unexplored areas. Such research can serve to
address some of the lingering questions about the role of law in promoting or
destabilizing trust and social capital. I submit that an area that is appropriate for
such an analysis is the home mortgage market in the United States generally, and the
subprime market in particular.
The current system of home mortgage finance is rife with instances where social
capital plays a critical role in the proper functioning of this market. The mortgage
borrower-lender relationship is one that traditionally has been defined by mutual
interdependence and elements of trust. Furthermore, informal information networks
have proven helpful in identifying potential borrowers and linking them to
prospective lenders. Given the deep interplay between social capital and the
mortgage market, it is thus helpful to attempt to analyze the subprime mortgage
meltdown to understand the role that social capital might have played in this collapse
and determine if the presence or absence of law and functioning legal institutions had
any impact on this demise.37
As the analysis in Part II, infra, shows, in many ways the crisis in the subprime
mortgage market can trace some of its root causes to the rupture of the traditional
borrower-lender relationship. At the heart of this relationship are elements of trust,
shared interests and shared risks: all essential features of an environment where
35

See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Formal and Informal Institutions, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A
MULTI-FACETED PERSPECTIVE 59, 64-67 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 2000)
(describing transition of developed economies with respect to nature of social capital at work
within them).
36

JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).

37

Interestingly, too, and for a variety of reasons, homeownership is closely tied to social
capital in that communities with higher homeownership rates enjoy higher rates of social
capital. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 204 (“Because of their greater rootedness,
homeowners are substantially more likely to be involved in community affairs than renters.”)
(citations omitted). According to one study that used the National Opinion Research Center’s
General Social Survey to compare the civic involvement of homeowners and renters, with
respect to several relevant indicators, homeowners were more active in their communities than
renters, controlling for many variables, including race, income and gender. The study showed
that homeowners were more likely to vote in local elections, more likely to know the names of
their local elected representatives, more likely to participate in non-professional associations,
more likely to get involved in civic causes and more likely to garden. See Denise DiPasquale
& Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives in Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens, 45 J.
URB. ECON. 354, 356 (1999).
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social capital can flourish. The legal system’s failure to remedy the breakdown of
social capital in the new world of subprime mortgage finance has led to the depth
and breadth of the crisis we currently face. Taking this into account, what follows is
an attempt to (1) gauge the extent to which the existing legal environment—one that
included few checks on the conduct of actors central to the functioning of the
market—fostered the market’s collapse and (2) propose solutions that can strengthen
social capital and, in the end, stabilize that market. As a central component of this
assessment, I analyze the impact of the subprime mortgage market on AfricanAmerican and Latino communities and assess, in light of this crisis and its
disproportionate impact on these communities, the effectiveness of the legal
protections in place that were originally designed to discourage mortgage lending
discrimination.
II. THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS
A. Overview of the Subprime Mortgage Market and Its Impact on Certain
Communities
The expansion of the subprime market generally was a result of several factors,
all of which are reviewed in detail below, e.g., the strength of the housing market;
relatively low interest rates; and deregulation that led to innovations in mortgage
products making loans available with less money down, and fewer documentation
requirements. The growth of securitization of subprime mortgage products
contributed to this expansion of subprime loans by converting future income streams
into immediate and liquid funds.38 In turn, the funds made available by securitization
were used to serve as capital to fund more home finance. In this way, through
securitization, the more loans originated meant more money was available for future
home finance. The presence of subprime loans as a percentage of all mortgages
originated in a given year increased from nearly 8% in 2003 to 20% in 2006. And
much of this expansion was funded by securitization; approximately 75% of the
$600 billion of all mortgages originated in a given year are now securitized.39
The increase in subprime lending has unquestionably made the dream of
homeownership available to people who, because of many factors—including
outright discrimination, community-based redlining and greater lender scrutiny of
perceived risk—might not have obtained a mortgage just a decade ago. Expanding
access to mortgage credit has resulted in significant gains in homeownership rates in
low– and moderate–income communities in general, with a disproportionate increase
in African-American and Latino communities. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, in 2006, the homeownership rate hit an all-time high of nearly 69% and
38

Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp.)[hereinafter Bair Testimony]; Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequences:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
(testimony of Roger T. Cole, Dir., Div. of Banking Supervision and Regulation)[hereinafter
Cole Testimony]; Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How did it Happen and
How will it End, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 13 (2007); Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course:
Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 503, 546 (2002).
39

Bair Testimony, supra note 38, at 2 (citations omitted).
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much of this expansion has been in poorer communities and communities of color.40
Borrowers who were seen as risky investments several years ago might have had
greater options available in the mortgage market due to the spread of subprime
mortgage products. Subprime lending thus opened the possibility of homeownership
to communities that long have had problems with access to credit for myriad
reasons.41
At the outset, it is important to note that this Article will focus on the effect of the
subprime mortgage market on communities with only a relatively weak historical
connection to the mortgage market, primarily communities of color that still carry

40
See John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent
Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets 4, n.4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working
Paper, No. 188, 2007) (citations omitted).
41
Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime
Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31 (2006). See, Michael S. Barr,
Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
513, 534-540 (2005) (providing overview of economic reasons for failure of the mortgage
market to serve certain communities). One of the prime reasons for the historical
discrepancies in the homeownership rates in communities of color is, no doubt, outright
discrimination. This history began with the explicit discriminatory preferences apparent in the
distribution of federal mortgage insurance in the post-WWII era, and was followed by
“redlining”, the decisions by many banks to exclude certain communities from mortgage
lending. See, DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 87-108 (2004); Adam Gordon, The Creation
of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made
Homeownership Accessible to Whites and out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L. J. 186 (2005).
Civil rights agitation and exposure of these practices led to a wave of statutes designed to
combat discriminatory practices with respect to mortgage lending, with a particular focus on
combating discriminatory rejection of lending by protected classes and communities. See Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-19 (2006) (FHA), Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§1691(a)-(f) (2006) (ECOA); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 280111 (2006) (HMDA), and the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (2006)
(CRA). While the FHA and ECOA do prohibit discrimination in lending, proving
discriminatory terms in the extension of a particular mortgage, as opposed to the denial of a
mortgage (which has its own problems of proof), can prove difficult. At the same time,
HMDA is a disclosure statute that requires certain banks to disclose their lending patterns; it
does not prohibit any particular conduct. Similarly, the CRA requires certain banks to meet
the needs of the communities they serve, consistent with safe and sound lending practices, and
requires federal bank regulators to take into account such banks’ records of meeting these
needs when those banks seek approval of certain transactions. It does not prohibit any
particular discriminatory conduct. See Barr, supra note 41, at 534. For an overview of the
CRA and the legislative history that led to its passage, see, RICHARD D. MARSICO,
DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAW, AND REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT, 11-28 (2005). The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA), 15 U.S.C. §§1639, 1648, is also intended to provide some protections against
predatory lending by requiring certain loan term disclosures. Because its protections are only
triggered when a mortgage’s interest rates are extremely high – higher than even most of the
worst subprime loans – HOEPA’s disclosure requirements only apply to approximately one
percent of subprime loans. EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA’S
LATEST BOOM AND BUST 28 (2007). Because HOEPA’s coverage is so limited, I will not
discuss it at any length here.
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vestigages of a long legacy of mortgage discrimination. Throughout, I will refer to
the impact of the crisis on African-American and Latino communities as a lens
through which to assess the most pernicious conduct of certain mortgage brokers and
loan originators: precisely the conduct, I would submit, that is greatly responsible for
the breadth and depth of this crisis. While there may be many well-intentioned
brokers and lenders that have worked responsibly in this sector, and there may be
just as many if not more borrowers who were utterly reckless, for the sake of the
discussion of the impact of law and trust on the subprime market, I will focus on
those features of the subprime crisis that are most relevant to communities
previously underserved by the mortgage industry. It is through such an analysis that
a reflection on the impact of law on trust is most fruitful. A review of the
development of the subprime market in general, and its impact on African-American
and Latino communities helps to make this connection clear.
While much of the growth in the mortgage market can be attributed to the
expansion of the subprime market generally, the distribution of subprime mortgages
falls more heavily in communities of color; more than half of the mortgages taken
out by African-American families in 2005 were of the subprime variety (as
compared to the industry average of 20%), and 40% of Latino families taking out
mortgages in 2005 were also subprime borrowers.42 Research on this phenomenon
indicates that this was no accident.43 And since a disproportionate share of
foreclosures can be traced to subprime mortgages, it is likely that, over the next few
years, a disproportionate share of foreclosure actions will involve borrowers of color.
Furthermore, the concentration of predatory subprime borrowing in AfricanAmerican and Latino communities cannot be disputed, and is the result of many
different factors.44 As stated in a report issued by several federal agencies:
42

Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, FED.
RES. BULL. A123, A160-161 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/
2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf.
43
CALIFORNIA REINVESTMENT COALITION ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN
DREAM: THE SUBPRIME SHAKEOUT AND ITS IMPACT ON LOWER-INCOME AND MINORITY
COMMUNITIES, 4-5 (2008), available at http://nedap.org/documents/MultistateHMDAReportFinal21.pdf (analyzing activity of “high-risk” lenders – entities that had failed and had
generated more than 50% of their loans as subprime loans – in seven metropolitan areas and
finding that over 40% of the loans by these entities were in predominantly minority
neighborhoods while only 10% of their loans were in predominantly white neighborhoods,
“suggest[ing] that these neighborhoods were targeted by high risk lenders”). These findings
are consistent with earlier patterns in the subprime market. A federal report from 2000 that
focused primarily on HMDA data from mortgage refinance loans in 1998 found as follows:
39% of residents from upper income African-American neighborhoods refinanced their
mortgages using subprime products as opposed to only 6% of residents of upper income white
neighborhoods utilizing such products.
Moreover, residents of low-income white
neighborhoods only utilized subprime products to refinance their mortgage 18% of the time,
so that upper-income residents of African-American neighborhoods were twice as likely to
utilize subprime refinance products as residents of low-income white neighborhoods. U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 48 (2000), available at http://www.hud.gov/
library/bookshelf12/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY REPORT].
44

For a discussion of the definitions of predatory and subprime borrowing, see infra Part

II.B.
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While predatory lending can occur in the prime market, such practices are
for the most part effectively deterred by competition among lenders,
greater homogeneity in loan terms and the prime borrowers’ greater
familiarity with complex financial transactions. In combination, these
factors make prime borrowers more likely to shop for the best loan terms
and less likely to fall victim to predatory loans. In addition, many prime
lenders are banks, thrifts, and credit unions that are subject to extensive
oversight and regulation by federal and state governments.45
The subprime market, on the other hand, “provides much more fertile ground for
predatory lending practices”46 for the following reasons: because of their difficulty in
obtaining financing in the past prospective subprime borrowers may underestimate
their own creditworthiness and accept the first offer of credit made without shopping
for better loan terms; because they frequently come from low-income and minority
communities that have been traditionally underserved by financial institutions they
may have fewer options available to them, lending alternatives might be harder to
find, or a person may be unaware of his or her options.47
In addition, subprime lenders active in many low-income and minority
communities are not subject to the same federal oversight as prime lenders, which
“may create an environment where predatory practices flourish because they are
unlikely to be detected.”48 Most importantly, the Community Reinvestment Act does
not cover most subprime lending; Fed Chairman Bernanke has asserted that fully
two-thirds of subprime mortgages are beyond the scope of the CRA.49 Since this
does not take into account other reasons why subprime mortgage lending might be

45

HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.

46

Id., at 18.

47

See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory
Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1571, 1583-84 (2002) (noting the absence of legitimate
lending activity in communities of color allows predatory lending to target such communities);
ALVARO CORTES ET AL., EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES FOR
HISPANICS: CASE STUDIES OF THREE MARKET AREAS (2006), available at
http://www.huduser.org/ Publications/PDF/hisp_homeown2.pdf (studying practices of Latino
communities in three urban settings and finding lack of information about the mortgage
process was the most significant barrier to homeownership and access to home mortgage
financing).
48

HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 43, at 18.

49

Ben S. Bernanke, The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New
Challenges, Speech at the Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, DC, 5
(March 30, 2007) (citation omitted), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20070330a.htm. See also, ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE REPORT, 70-72 & chart
available at http://www.novoco.com/low_income_housing/resource_files/
14 (2000),
research_center/crareport.pdf (analyzing HMDA data from 1993 through 1998 and finding
that two thirds of the increase in subprime lending to low- and moderate-income communities
during this period was from subprime lenders not covered by the CRA whereas only 15% of
these loans were originated by CRA-covered institutions).
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beyond the scope of the CRA, the percentage is actually much higher.50 Indeed,
there are several reasons for this gap in the CRA’s coverage. First, most subprime
borrowers are not covered by the CRA.51 Second, even banks that are covered by the
CRA engage in subprime lending outside their CRA “assessment area”, thus
excluding such activity from review by federal regulators enforcing the CRA.52
Third, some banks might engage in subprime lending through affiliates and
subsidiaries, which they can elect to exclude from CRA review as well.53
All of these forces have led to the dramatic increase in subprime lending in
communities of color. As the trajectory of the subprime market crisis has proven,
however, this greater access to credit has, undoubtedly, come with a price. First and
foremost, subprime borrowers—because of their status and the nature of the
mortgages they purchased—are saddled with far less favorable terms (e.g., higher
interest rates than “prime” borrowers, greater closing costs and fees, and penalties
for early satisfaction of the loan). The problem, however, is much deeper, and goes
to the very structure of the market. As the following discussion shows, the
intervention of brokers and subprime mortgage originators in the mortgage process
has led to an increase in subprime lending in communities where pent up demand
and a lack of information about the mortgage process led to abuse. Furthermore, the
incentive structure in place, due, for the most part, to the securitization process,
means the actors seeking to originate these loans placed a higher premium on the
quantity of mortgage loans made, and not their quality. They worked hard to make
as many deals as possible, as quickly as possible, regardless of the borrower’s ability
to meet the demands of the mortgage. Once the mortgage was sold and packaged as
part of a securitization deal, it became harder for the borrower to renegotiate terms of
the agreement should hardship occur. For some borrowers at least, should they
default on their mortgage agreement and lose their homes to foreclosure, they will be
worse off than if they had never purchased the home in the first place. They stand to
lose whatever equity they may have had in the home, cannot reclaim any closing
costs or fees they might have paid, and will suffer displacement. What follows in
50
William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Community
Reinvestment Act: Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges, 9 FED. RES.
BANK of N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., June 2003, at 169, 180 (noting that in 2000, only 3% of
subprime loans were made by CRA covered institutions in their assessment areas, and 96% of
subprime refinance loans were made by independent mortgage companies and covered
institutions lending out of their CRA assessment areas).
51
Many subprime lenders are “non-depository institutions,” and thus are exempt from the
CRA. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 1813 (2006). For an overview of the different regulatory
structures for depository and non-depository institutions, see Patricia A. McCoy and Elizabeth
Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional Home Mortgages, HARV.
U., JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, Policy Paper # UCC08-5, February 2008, at 20-23,
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/whatsnew/new_pubs.html.
52

See, e.g., 12 CFR § 25.41(a) (2005) (describing how a regulated entity’s “assessment
area” is established for the purpose of CRA review). For a critique of the limitations of using
an assessment area approach to CRA review, see MARSICO, supra note 41, at 177-178.
53

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 48, at 1588-1589; Richard D. Marsico, Subprime
Lending, Predatory Lending, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 46 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
735 (noting that banks have the option of including the lending of their affiliates in the
regulators’ CRA review of the parent bank) (citation omitted).
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this section is an analysis of the subprime mortgage crisis: how we got here and the
causes of the crisis.
B. Definitions
In the first instance, it is important to define the meaning of the term “subprime
mortgage.” In testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Roger T. Cole, Director of the Federal Reserve’s Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation described the use of the term “subprime borrower” as to
refer to those “who do not qualify for prime interest rates because they exhibit one or
more of the following characteristics: weakened credit histories typically
characterized by payment delinquencies, previous charge-offs, judgments or
bankruptcies; low credit scores; high debt-burden ratios; or high loan-to-value
ratios.”54
In addition to these characteristics of subprime borrowers, the loans generally
considered as subprime also typically have higher upfront costs, in terms of fees
associated with closing the loan (such as appraisal and application fees), and
continuing costs stemming from higher interest rates.55 They are often identifiable
by such other “hybrid” characteristics as an initial, low introductory interest rate
(sometimes called a “teaser” rate, for obvious reasons) that is in effect for two or
three years (or sometimes even for just a few months), that then changes to an
adjustable rate for the remainder of the life of the loan. In some ways, then, we
define subprime mortgages by the characteristics of the borrowers as well as by the
terms of the loans that are made to them.
For the purposes of this discussion, the term “subprime borrower” will be used
when discussing a borrower who possesses the characteristics that make him or her
ineligible for a prime or “Alt-A” loans (described below). The term “subprime
mortgage” will be used when discussing a mortgage product that has terms that are
less favorable to the borrower than a typical prime mortgage.56

54

Cole Testimony, supra note 38, at 2 (citations omitted).

55

Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 41, at 32.

56

Another term that is often used to define some subprime lending is “predatory lending”.
Yet defining this term is itself problematic. One attempt to “distill” such a definition from a
variety of other attempts considers predatory lending as lending that “occurs when a lender
extends to a consumer a loan with unfavorable terms that are structured to strip the equity
from the home, possibly resulting in foreclosure on the home used to secure the loan and
personal bankruptcy for the consumer.” Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City
Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 757, 761 (2007). Others have
attempted to collect a series of predatory features, the presence of “one or more” of them in a
mortgage transaction would render that transaction predatory in nature: e.g., “asset-based”
lending, which occurs when a loan is made based on the value of the collateral, and not on the
ability of the borrower to repay the loan. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of
Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 12591270 (2002). See also, Patricia Sturdevant & William Brennan, Jr., A Catalogue of Predatory
Lending Practices, 5 CONSUMER ADVOC. 4 (1999) (cataloguing list of predatory lending
practices). While many predatory loans are subprime loans, not all subprime loans are
necessarily predatory in nature. Since many of the practices described herein would fall under
the various definitions of predatory lending contained in the literature on this issue, there is no
doubt that many of these abuses could be described as predatory and would fit within any
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In terms of the overall mortgage market, more than 75% of the 43 million firstlien mortgage loans outstanding in the United States are for prime borrowers, while
subprime borrowers represent about 13 or 14% of the total. What remains are
borrowers sometimes referred to as “Alt-A”, or “near prime”; these are borrowers
who might have good credit, but have other deficiencies on their record, like high
debt-to-income ratios or have less of an ability to document their income than the
typical prime borrower.57
C. The Path to the Crisis
Subprime lending is a relatively recent phenomenon, and has been made more
prevalent by statutory changes to banking legislation in the 1980s, and innovations in
the way that mortgages are financed.58 First, state interest rate caps on mortgages
were preempted by federal legislation in 1980 through the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA).59 In 1982, lenders were
permitted to offer adjustable rate mortgages through the Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act of 1982 (AMTPA).60 The Tax Reform Act of 198661
encouraged more home lending as the interest paid on residential mortgages
remained as the only consumer loans where the interest paid was tax deductible.62 In
the end, deregulation was critical to getting subprime lending off the ground.
Federal deregulation permitted lenders to charge a risk premium to less
creditworthy borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and fees.
Equally importantly, deregulation allowed lenders to market new and
more complex types of mortgage products, including adjustable rate
mortgages and loans with balloon payments and negative amortization,
which expanded the pool of eligible borrowers and helped lenders control
for interest-rate risk.63
While the growth of subprime lending generally and securitization in particular
first began in the mid-1990s, questions about the risk involved in investing in

definition of predatory lending. For the sake of simplicity, I will utilize the term “subprime
lending”.
57

Cole Testimony, supra note 38, at 2 (citations omitted).

58

While the first mortgage-backed security was issued over 100 years ago, the modern era
of securitization began in 1970 with government-issued securities from the Government
National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”). These securities carried little risk because
the underlying loans that were the collateral for the securities met the federal government’s
underwriting criteria. See, e.g., Eggert, supra note 38, at 537.
59
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. §
226 (2006) (DIDMCA).
60
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-06 (2006)
(AMTPA).
61

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.

62

Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 3; Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 41,

at 38.
63

McCoy & Renuart, supra note 51, at 7 (citation omitted).
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subprime lending, coupled with the Asian fiscal crisis on 1998, slowed the growth of
subprime lending and securitization towards the end of the 1990s. With the steady
and growing strength of the housing market after 2000, with its brief interruption
after the events of September 11, 2001, interest and investment in subprime lending
started to grow again, and went through substantial growth from 2003 through
2006.64 According to Inside Mortgage Finance, in 2006 approximately 20% of total
originations were subprime loans, and 25% of the total mortgage securitizations were
backed by subprime mortgages.65
D. Overview of the Mortgage and Securitization Process
In the modern mortgage transaction, a prospective borrower communicates with a
mortgage broker and expresses an interest in pursuing a mortgage to purchase a
home, or seeks to refinance a current mortgage. This relationship may have been
pre-existing (in the case of a refinance, the broker might have handled the underlying
mortgage), or, may have begun as a response to marketing by the broker directly,
through in-person marketing, targeted mailing, or generally, through print or other
media advertising. Importantly, in many jurisdictions, the broker owes no
independent duty, fiduciary or otherwise, to seek out the best mortgage product for
the borrower, and the borrower, who likely has incomplete (at best) knowledge about
the market, relies heavily on the broker to obtain the most favorable terms.66
The broker will typically gather information about the borrower’s
creditworthiness: i.e., an assessment is made about the borrower’s likely ability to
pay back a loan. Information that is gathered will include the prospective borrower’s
work and credit history; any history of prior liens, judgments and/or bankruptcies;
the nature and size of any assets he or she might possess; and his or her income
amount and sources. Far more often than not, this information is gathered by a credit
rating agency, and a score is calculated by that independent agency based on these
and other factors. An estimated loan amount is taken into account, and an estimated
monthly payment is calculated based on the terms of that loan. The credit score is
intended to serve as an indicator of the borrower’s ability to pay back a loan based
on the expected terms (one important factor that is taken into account is the
anticipated monthly payments when viewed against the household’s monthly
income).67
Based on this analysis, the products that might be available to the prospective
borrower are identified. If the prospective borrower has a high credit rating, high
and stable income, significant savings, and little debt, “prime” mortgage products
will be available to her. If the prospective borrower has a poor credit rating, unstable

64

Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross., supra note 41, at 41-43.

65

The Role of Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Warren
Kornfeld, Managing Dir. of Moody’s Inv. Serv.)[hereinafter Kornfeld Testimony].
66

See infra Part III.

67

Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv.,
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Christopher L. Peterson, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of
Fla.)[hereinafter Peterson Testimony].
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income and/or high credit card or other debt, she might be classified as eligible only
for a subprime mortgage, which would generally have terms that are less favorable to
the borrower.
After undertaking a review of the prospective borrower’s creditworthiness, the
mortgage broker then tries to identify potential products that a loan originator might
offer to the borrower. The originator can be a bank in the classic sense, one that is
also in the business of home lending, or simply a mortgage bank that specializes in
originating home loans. Once a match is made by the broker, an originator offers a
mortgage product to the borrower and that product is accepted by the borrower, the
mortgage agreement is then consummated.
As is typical today, soon after the mortgage agreement is recorded with the
proper government authorities, typically a county clerk, the originator often starts the
process of transferring the lender’s interest. Sometimes the single mortgage is sold
on what is called the secondary mortgage market, where financial institutions
purchase the originator’s interest in the loan: the right to collect the payments and the
right to foreclose should the borrower default on her obligations. When the
originator plans to “securitize” the mortgage it will transfer its interest in the
mortgage to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), typically a trust, which holds multiple
mortgages in its portfolio, creating a pool of loans.68
Once the SPV is created, the process of securitization begins. The assets of the
SPV (for the most part, the income streams that flow from the mortgagors’
obligations under the mortgages held by the SPV)—whether it is the right of
payment of interest on the loans in the pool, or the payment of principal, or some
other right—are classified into “tranches” (French for “strips”), and those tranches
are then packaged as securities to be sold to investors. The terms of these securities
will generally require some payment to the investors from the income streams
generated by payment of interest and/or principal on the loans.69
Working with an underwriter and rating agency, the different tranches are
examined for the risk related to the assets (the income streams) that back them.
Typically, the bond rating agency relies on information provided by the lender,
especially the representations and warranties made that guarantee that the loans in
the pool all complied with applicable law when they were originated.70 It also looks
at information in the aggregate concerning the loans in a particular pool, analyzing
information such as credit scores, the equity borrowers have in their homes, and
documentation of income and assets. An assessment is also made of the lender itself,
reviewing its underwriting standards as well as its lending and performance history.71
With larger pools, involving many mortgages, the underwriter and rating agency
review a sample of the loans backing a particular security for the relative risk of
default of the borrowers under those loans, and often rely on the representations of
the originator that the sample is typical of the types of loans in the pool. High risk

68

Eggert, supra note 38, at 539; Peterson Testimony, supra note 67, at 5.

69

Kornfeld Testimony, supra note 65, at 9.

70

Id., at 13.

71

Id., at 13-14.
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will translate into a lower rating for the security, or will result in the removal of the
riskier assets from the pool of loans backing the security.72
Sometimes the originator is asked to insure the purchasers of the securities (the
investors) against the risk, thereby improving the risk rating. “Credit enhancements”
are also employed by the originator to make investing in the securities more
attractive by lowering the risk associated with the investment. Such enhancements
can include loan guarantees from an insurance company or similar guarantor, the
creation of the security with the value of the collateral backing the security greater
than the aggregate amount of the securities issued (“overcollateralization”), and/or
the creation of a hierarchy of tranches whereby certain tranches are more exposed to
risk than others.73 In addition, many security agreements require that the originator
make certain representations with respect to the types of interests included in a
particular tranche. If the representations prove unfounded with respect to particular
assets included in that tranche, the originator might be forced to take back those
assets.
Investors—mutual funds, pensions, hedge funds, brokerage houses, and
individuals—then purchase the securities created and backed by the assets in the
SPV. An independent agent, known as the servicer, handles the day-to-day
management of the individual mortgages backing the securities. That servicer is
responsible for collecting the monthly payments of interest and principal, monitoring
loans in default, and typically is responsible for pursuing foreclosures where
necessary.74
E. The Current Crisis: Loosening Standards and Perverse Incentives
With the weakening of the home mortgage market, the drive to continue to issue
mortgage-backed securities led many lenders to loosen their underwriting criteria
and write riskier loans. As the following discussion shows, the incentive structure in
the market, combined with a lack of accountability in the system, has led to the
present state of the subprime mortgage market: rising defaults, bankrupt lenders,
devalued securities, and skittish markets.
1. Information Asymmetry and Conflicting Loyalty
Subprime brokers and loan originators had a substantial advantage over their
prospective customers: possessing a wealth of information about the mortgage
market, the products available and the terms for which those prospective borrowers
might qualify. This asymmetry of information meant that prospective mortgagors
had insufficient information about a range of issues related to the mortgages they
were seeking.75
72

Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization:,Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs Comm.’s Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., and Invs.,
110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Kurt Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman Univ. School of
Law)[hereinafter Eggert Testimony].
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Kornfeld Testimony, supra note 65, at 10.

74

Eggert Testimony, supra note 72, at 7; Peterson Testimony, supra note 67, at 6.

75

An argument certainly can be made, and has, that lenders also suffer from asymmetry of
information because they do not know, for certain, the credit risk of a potential borrower. In a
now classic article, it was assumed that a lender’s lack of information about the risks
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For example, prospective borrowers may not have had a full understanding of the
origination fees and mortgage insurance costs that would be assessed against them.
They may not have understood the impact of rate changes with an adjustable rate
mortgage. Borrowers may not have understood complicated terms of hybrid
subprime loans, and not even the Chairman of the Federal Reserve can predict what
interest rates will be in two years, yet borrowers were supposed to understand the
consequences of having an adjustable rate mortgage and what their monthly
payments would be once their interest rate re-set.
Because many might have been less sophisticated borrowers, from communities
with less of a history of homeownership, they might not have had ready access to a
neighbor or family member with knowledge and experience with a home mortgage
to assist them in understanding what holding a mortgage meant, or to explain to them
the products and features for which they should have bargained and those of which
they should have steered clear.
Borrowers might have had an irrationally optimistic view of the housing market,
and felt they could refinance their way out of future trouble. Brokers and lenders
interested in prospective refinance clients might not have disabused prospective
buyers of either of these beliefs. Borrowers may also have had an incomplete picture
of the mortgage options available to them given their credit risk, or may have been
steered into a less favorable mortgage product out of incentives their broker or
originator may have had to sell them a particular product.
Simply put, in many instances, brokers and loan originators exploited this
information asymmetry, leading many unsophisticated borrowers into loan
agreements they did not understand and could not afford.
2. Severing the Borrower-Lender Relationship
A second development that has led to the current crisis is the fact that the
traditional relationship between borrower and lender has broken down and a new,
“atomized” relationship exists where the incentive structure for mortgage brokers
and originators leads to faulty loans and little accountability.76 In the traditional
relationship, the borrower and lender had mutual interests: the borrower in
maintaining current in his or her loan, and the lender in the borrower’s performance
and a reliable stream of income. This relationship was long-term, and might have
even been pre-existing (i.e., the borrower might have used loan products from the
lender in the past, or had maintained depository accounts with that lender).
As the Chairperson of the FDIC recently explained:
Prior to widespread use of securitization, home finance typically involved
a bank or savings institution granting a loan to a borrower. The lending
associated with lending would lead to credit rationing. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew
Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393
(1981). Due to the expansion of the subprime market through deregulation, and with
standardized underwriting criteria and the increased availability of credit funds through
securitization, credit rationing was not a primary concern during the explosion in the subprime
market.
76

Eggert, supra note 38, at 552. See also Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset
Securitization and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 188 (2005) (explaining
that asset securitization insulates the loan originator from fluctuations in the value of
underlying collateral).
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institution would make the decision to grant credit, fund the loan, and
collect payments. In the event of borrower default, the same institution
could choose to restructure the loan or foreclose on the property. The
lender also might have an established relationship with the borrower, and,
thus, be able to evaluate the relative long-term benefits of various
alternatives. 77
Innovations in underwriting and liquidity from securitization have also
“weakened the traditional long-term relationship between the borrower and the
company that originated and serviced his mortgage loan.”78
A graphic portrayal of this shift in the structure of the mortgage market is helpful
to recognize this change.
Figure 1.79

Bank

Receives interest
and principal.
Lends Money.
Manages delinquencies.

Borrower

The first figure represents the traditional borrower-lender relationship, with its
shared responsibilities, where mutual interdependence is critical to its functioning.
The second, more complex figure below represents the current web of diffuse
relationships, where accountability for bad loans is hard to trace.

77

Bair Testimony, supra note 38, at 2.

78

Krinsman, supra note 38, at 14.

79

Bair Testimony, supra note 38, at 2.
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Figure 2.80
Step 1: The Borrower obtains a loan from
a Lender. This may be done with help from
a Mortgage Broker. In many cases, the
Lender and the Mortgage Broker have no
further interaction with the Borrower after
the loan is made.

Mortgage
Broker
Loan
Proceeds

Lender

Borrower

Loan

Step 2: The Lender sells the loan to the
Issuer and the Borrower begins making
monthly payments to the Servicer.

Monthly Payments

Loans

Cash

Cash

Servicer
Trustee

Monthly Payments

Underwriter
Rating Agency

Issuer

Credit Enhancement

Securities
Monthly
Payments

Cash

Investors

Step 3: The Issuer sells securities to the
investors. The Underwriter assists in the
sale, the Rating Agency rates the securities,
and Credit Enhancement may be obtained.
Step 4: The Servicer collects monthly
payments from the Borrower and remits
payments to the Issuer. The Servicer and
theTrustee manage delinquent loans
according to terms set forth in the Pooling &
Servicing Agreement.

In addition, federally regulated financial institutions are more closely regulated
for safety and soundness concerns as compared to non-bank lenders81 and many
subprime lenders are beyond the reach of such laws as the Community Reinvestment
Act.82 Furthermore, bank lenders are not shielded by the holder in due course
doctrine for any fraud or illegality in the loans they originate and hold. For these
reasons, lending by traditional banks that hold their mortgages tends to be less risky
and such lenders are less dominant in the subprime mortgage market. Indeed, nonbank lenders made 50% of the subprime loans in 2006.83
80

Id.

81

Engel & McCoy, supra note 56, at 1291-1292.

82

See supra Part II.A.

83

Eggert Testimony, supra note 72, at 8-9.
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Instead of the traditional relationship, which involved a borrower and a federally
regulated lending institution, the new borrower and lender relationship is often
mediated by a mortgage broker with unclear loyalties.84 The connection between
subprime lending and the role of the mortgage broker could not be clearer. One
study that looked at the role of the mortgage broker in lending showed that nearly
half of all subprime loans reviewed went through a broker, while only 28% of prime
loans involved such a broker.85 The role of the broker also has racial aspects: one
study showed that 64% of African-American borrowers used a broker, while only
38% of White borrowers did so.86
3. Weakening Underwriting Criteria
The problems embedded in the subprime mortgage market—rising risk of
unaffordability due to higher fees and interest rates and adjustable rate mortgages
waiting to reset at a higher rate—lay dormant during a time of “froth” in the housing
market.87 As home prices continued to rise and even after initial “teaser” rates
expired and adjustable rate mortgage terms kicked in, existing borrowers were able
to refinance mortgages with unfavorable terms due to the increased equity they
enjoyed with rising home prices. Because of the strength of the housing market,
subprime borrowers were able to stave off default in many subprime mortgages
simply be refinancing their home mortgages. These refinances made more money
available to borrowers, and borrowers dipped into their growing equity to pay their
mortgage brokers and originators for the ability to refinance, even when these actors
may have been the same individuals and companies the borrowers had paid when
they assumed the initial underlying mortgage. In this way, the strong market delayed
any questions about affordability of the underlying mortgage, or the inequitable
nature of its terms, to a day when rising home values could no longer make up for
the borrower’s inability to meet the terms of his or her mortgage. Furthermore,
underwriting standards were loosened in the drive to write more mortgages and to
continue the mill of mortgages and refinances, the steady stream of fees they
generated for brokers and originators, and the income they could produce by sale in
the securities market.
Another common phenomenon was “risk layering”:

84

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA): Simplifying and Improving the Process
of Obtaining Mortgages To Reduce Settlement Costs to Consumers, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134,
49,140 (July 29, 2002) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500). According to the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): “During the 1980’s and 1990’s, the
rise of secondary mortgage market financing resulted in the emergence of new retail entities,
notably mortgage brokers, to compete with traditional mortgage originators, lending
institutions, and mortgage bankers. Today, mortgage brokers are estimated to originate more
than 60% of the nation’s mortgages.” Id.
85
INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE, THE 2004 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL
(2004).
86

Kellie Kim-Sung & Sharon Hermanson, Experiences of Older Refinance Mortgage Loan
Borrowers: Broker- and Lender- Originated Loans. 83 AARP PPI DATA DIGEST 1 (2003),
available at http://0-assets.aarp.org.mill1.sjlibrary.org/rgcenter/post-import/dd83_loans.pdf.
87
Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan is Concerned about “Froth” in Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2005, at C1.
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originators taking chances on borrowers who met more than one of the criteria for a
subprime loan.88
In 2006, when home prices flattened, interest rates rose, and more onerous loan
terms started to kick in for many subprime mortgagors, the subprime crisis began to
take its toll on the market, and the numbers of loan defaults began to rise.89
Furthermore, the downturn in the market may have also driven up demand for more
originations, to maintain the flow of fees they generate for the originator and to
satisfy the investors who were still seeking opportunities in the mortgage-backed
securities market. These forces may have resulted in loosening of underwriting
criteria even further, meaning new loans were made to borrowers who, in the end,
were greater risks.90 Indeed, according to an analysis conducted by Moody’s, the
rate of subprime mortgages delinquent more than sixty days included in
securitization pools rated by Moody’s increased dramatically—nearly doubling—
with respect to mortgages originated in 2006 when compared with performance of
subprime mortgages originated in 2002 to 2005 also included in securitization pools.
This strongly suggests that mortgages consummated later in time, after underwriting
criteria were loosened, were more likely unsuitable for those borrowers.91
This cycle was no aberration, and is simple to understand: when borrowing
demand slows, originators lower their criteria and make riskier loans to maintain the
origination rate and continue the steady flow of fees that are generated by and
accompany each origination.92 And this seems to be exactly what happened here;
lenders used lax underwriting standards to originate more subprime loans. They
lowered their documentation requirements, did not verify borrowers stated income
and permitted 100% financing of loans (i.e., originated “no money down”
mortgages).93 Indeed, the rise in early defaults (loans that went into default just
months after origination) in the final quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2007
were likely the result of lax underwriting criteria.94
4. Perverse Incentives
At the heart of this loosening of underwriting criteria lies a simple fact about the
incentives inherent in the current mortgage market. Amid growing concerns about
risk in the market and the rising specter of default the riskier the loan and the more
onerous its terms, mortgage brokers and originators benefited from a relentless drive
to securitize more mortgages, despite these risks. Indeed, the cycles of finance and
re-finance taking place throughout the years 2002 through 2005 meant even more
income for the brokers and originators; they would collect their fees with each
consummated mortgage or refinance agreement. In this way, the interest of the
88

Krinsman, supra note 38, at 14.

89

Cole Testimony, supra note 38, at 4; Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 7; Krinsman, supra
note 38, at 13; Kornfeld Testimony, supra note 65, at 6-7.
90

Krinsman, supra note 38, at 14.

91

Kornfeld Testimony, supra note 65, at 4.

92

Id. at 5-6.

93

Krinsman, supra note 38, at 15.

94

Id. at 5.
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mortgage brokers and originators is to enter into as many mortgages as possible and
get them into the market as securities as quickly as possible. The brokers want their
fees, and to make more with each transaction, and the originator wants to get as
many mortgages as possible into the securities market, because they make money for
selling these securities.95 As described by several analysts looking at the problem:
Safeguards ensuring prudent lending were weakened by a combination of
fee-driven remuneration at each stage of the securitization process and the
dispersion of credit risk which weakened monitoring incentives. Hence,
intermediaries were remunerated primarily by generating loan volume
rather than quality, even as the credit spreads on the resulting securities
shrank.96
In recent experience, with the rise of the securitization market, the incentive
structure has changed, rewarding quantity over quality.97 The broker seeks to
identify a mortgage product for which the borrower might qualify, but might not
think of the long-term viability of the borrower to meet his or her obligations. With
the incentive of a quick payday once the mortgage is transferred to another entity for
sale as a security, the broker and originator, who are both now interested in
generating the fees associated with the mortgage closing, are driven by a desire to
package as many loans as possible, and are not concerned with the borrower’s
likelihood of default under the mortgage. The lender no longer has an incentive that
is tied to the borrower’s interest in long-term sustainability of the mortgage, and the
broker is no longer interested in his or her reputation of bringing viable borrowers to
the lenders. The subprime market thus created a classic “moral hazard” similar to
that created during the Savings & Loan crisis where banks could lend regardless of
the risk;98 with an advantage in information, no accountability and little risk, brokers
and originators in the subprime market were able to engage in aggressive rent
seeking, leaving borrowers and the holders of securities with no recourse and
devalued assets.
When few lenders service the loans they originate, there is less of an incentive to
monitor the relative risks associated with lending to a borrower for whom a
particular loan is unaffordable, in utter disregard for the danger of default. When the
whole incentive structure favors quantity over quality, however, it was to be
expected that we would find ourselves in exactly the situation we are in: growing
default rates, especially so-called “early defaults”—where the borrower falls behind
on payments in the first few months of the loan.

95

Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 11; Krinsman, supra note 38, at 14.

96

Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 7.

97

Eggert Testimony, supra note 72, at 10; Peterson Testimony, supra note 67, at 10.

98

See John C. Coffee, Jr., WHAT CAUSED ENRON? A CAPSULE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE 1990S, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 278 (2004) (describing savings and loan
crisis as moral hazard problem).
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5. Undercapitalized Lenders
Recently, securitization agreements have begun to include clauses which require
the originator to take back loans in early default.99 But even where such
securitization agreements do require originators to take back loans in early default,
these originators suffer significant losses on these loans. Due to the fact that the loan
is in default, it must be purchased back by the originator at a discounted rate. Since
many of these loan origination companies have few liquid assets themselves, they
might not be able to finance these forced re-purchases and there is little recourse
against the originator should it simply file for bankruptcy when the volume of the
defaulted loans it must take back becomes too burdensome.100 As a result of these
forces, mass defections from the market have ensued: “[s]ince the end of 2006, over
30 subprime originators have filed for bankruptcy or gone out of business. In almost
every case, the subprime originators that went out of business were specialty finance
lenders and were not institutions with federally insured deposits.”101
6. Limits on Forbearance
Where early default has not occurred, and the investors hold a loan in default and
cannot force the originator to buy it back, securitization often makes it more difficult
to handle default and avoid foreclosure, which leads to the identification of a second
problem: lack of an ability on the part of the servicer to permit deviation from the
strict terms of the loan to avoid default. Such measures can offer a borrower the
chance to comply with his or her long-term obligations under the loan, and can
include reductions in the interest rate owed on the loan, extension of the loan term to
bring down monthly charges, deferral of payment obligations and outright
forgiveness of certain payments and penalties.102
The barriers securitization agreements may hold for renegotiating borrower
obligations come in several forms. First, the terms of many securities limit the
extent to which a servicer can negotiate with an individual borrower in default, and
there is likely no pre-existing relationship between the borrower and lender that can
help facilitate these negotiations.103 “When difficulty arises in making payments on a
securitized loan, the borrower generally will not be dealing with the local banker
with whom there might be an established relationship. Instead, the borrower will be
dealing with the servicer.”104
Second, the servicer must act in the perceived best interest of the investors. If a
workout would meet those interests, the interests of the borrower and investors are
aligned. If, however, foreclosure on the collateral is in the best interest of the
investors, the terms of the securitization agreement covering that asset will require
that the service take action to carry out the foreclosure.105
99

Krinsman, supra note 38, at 15-16.

100

Id. at 16; Cole Testimony, supra note 38, at 3.

101

Krinsman, supra note 38, at 16.

102

Kornfeld Testimony, supra note 65, at 17.

103

Bair Testimony, supra note 38, at 4; Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 13.

104

Bair Testimony, supra note 38, at 4.

105

Id.; see also Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 13.
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Third, some securitization agreements might limit the percentage of loans
modified to five to ten percent of the original value of the outstanding loans.106 Most
securitization conduits are established as Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits
(REMICs). The REMIC structure excludes the entity from taxation, although the
investors’ income is taxable. However, using such a structure has implications for
the ability of the servicer to modify the terms of the loans in the event of default by a
particular borrower. In order to qualify for the tax benefits of the REMIC structure,
the loan pool must be static, and modifications of the loans contained in the pool can
only take place if default under the loan is reasonably foreseeable.107 Such a
limitation means that loans cannot be restructured in anticipation of default, e.g., in
the event a borrower loses a job and has some assets to liquidate to satisfy the
mortgage for a period of time. Under the terms of the REMIC, the borrower
probably cannot restructure payments until after he or she goes into default. Even
with a borrower in default, some deals require a legal opinion prior to any
restructuring of that borrower’s loan that would assure the investors that such a
restructuring would not impact the tax benefits of the REMIC status.108 Sometimes,
the servicer must obtain the consent of the ratings agency, the bond insurer and/or
guarantors or entities providing credit enhancement to support a particular pool of
loans before restructuring any debt in those pools.109
These barriers are proving difficult to overcome. Indeed, a recent survey of loan
servicers conducted by Moody’s found that just 1% of adjustable rate mortgages
where the rates had recently been adjusted had been modified by those servicers.110
Conclusion:
As the previous discussion shows, there are several reasons for the current crisis
in the subprime mortgage market. One of the chief causes of the crisis is the fact that
subprime mortgage loans were made under market forces that encouraged brokers
and originators to promote mortgages with little regard for the viability of the
106

Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 13. See also, Krinsman, supra note 38, at 18 (“The
terms of pooling and service agreements for subprime [asset backed securities] often restrict
the percentage of loans that can be modified if the loans aren’t defaulted or reasonably likely
to default.”); Kornfeld Testimony, supra note 65, at 17 (“Some residential mortgage
securitizations have limits on the percentage of loans in any pool that the servicer may
modify.”).
107

Bair Testimony, supra note 38, at 5; Michael S. Gambro & Scott Leichtner, Selected
Legal Issues Affecting Securitization, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 131, 157 (1997).
108
See, Joint Statement, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, et al, “Statement on Loss
Mitigation Strategies for Servicers of Residential Mortgages,” Sept. 4, 2007, (confirming that
the Department of the Treasury has indicated that REMIC rules permit modification of loan
terms when default is reasonable foreseeable), at pp. 2-3 and n. 3,( citing 26 CFR 1.860G2(b)(3)(i)), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov /newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg2007090
4a1.pdf.
109

Bair Testimony, supra note 38, at 5-6.

110

Michael P. Drucker and William Fricke, “Moody’s Subprime Mortgage Servicer Survey
on Loan Modifications,” Moody’s Investors Service (2007), available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/Moodys_subprime_loanmod.pdf.
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borrower, driven by a short-term desire for the profits generated by mortgage
origination and securitization, as opposed to the long-term concerns that surround
safe and sound lending practices.
Borrowers suffer from asymmetries of
information, and must rely on mortgage brokers—who might have conflicting
loyalties, or, at worst, have interests in direct opposition to those of the borrower—
for information about the mortgage products available to them, the nature of their
obligations under different mortgage products, and the extent to which their
obligations might change over time (for example, with adjustable rate mortgages). If
a borrower falls behind on his or her obligations, and a loan enters into default, a
securitization agreement that impacts that loan may limit the extent to which the
borrower can seek accommodations to assist in avoiding foreclosure. With these
phenomena in mind, what follows is an application of social capital theory to the
subprime mortgage crisis, emphasizing innovative approaches that might help to
resolve some of these problems inherent in the current system.
III. SOCIAL CAPITAL TO THE RESCUE: RE-INFUSING THE MORTGAGE PROCESS WITH
TRUST, MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNALIZED RISK
From a social capital perspective, many of the features and sources of the
subprime mortgage crisis set forth above stem from deficiencies in structural social
capital. Social capital is absent when prospective borrowers do not have contacts on
whom they can rely for legitimate information about the risks and rewards of
pursuing a home mortgage, whether this is an informal source of information, like a
neighbor or community-based organization, or something more formal, like a
mortgage broker looking out for the borrower’s best interest. As a result of these
forces, there are failures of both bonding and bridging social capital.
In low-income communities, and other communities with low homeownership
rates, the informal information network—the “horizontal” bonds between
individuals—is often not of a quality that can provide critical information to the
prospective borrower because other members of the network are similarly situated;
they have no more information on the mortgage market than the prospective
borrower. In this way, “pooling” of information about honest brokers and fair deals
is not possible in communities with little information at the outset.111
As HUD notes, apart from other barriers to homeownership that face
communities of color, like discrimination and inadequate access to capital for a down
payment, low-income, minority and immigrant communities also face a lack of
access to traditional mortgage lenders and adequate information about the mortgage
process.112 Similarly, families with little connection to the financial system, who
111
See generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213
(1961) (discussing the impact of information networks on markets).
112

See HUD’s Housing Goals for the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for the Years 2005–2008
and Amendments to HUD’s Regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,585
(Nov. 2. 2004) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81). See also, William Apgar & Allegra Calder,
The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 101,
101 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (noting low-income and minority borrowers less
likely to comparison shop for mortgage products and less likely to have information about the
mortgage market).
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often do not have banking accounts or credit cards, will have a difficult time meeting
stringent underwriting criteria.113
When new subprime mortgage products came onto the scene, the history of
mortgage discrimination in communities of color meant there were more prospective
homebuyers available in such communities, such prospective homebuyers had less
information about the mortgage market and subprime lenders faced little competition
for such consumers from more traditional banks.114 It is no accident that much of the
increase in the homeownership rate in communities of color noted above has been
fueled by subprime products, and that, controlling for disparities in income and
potential disparities in credit risk, African-American borrowers are more likely than
White borrowers to have subprime mortgages.115
With respect to bridging social capital, the formal forces of the market and the
legal structures in place weakened the traditional relationships where bridging social
capital could flourish: the “vertical” relationships between borrowers, brokers and
mortgage lenders and the incentive structures embedded in the market, which
increased the quantity and not the quality of home mortgages. Furthermore, there
was an utter lack of accountability in the mortgage process, where brokers often
acted with impunity and may have had conflicting loyalties between the borrower
and the lender. Similarly, undercapitalized originators were able to sell risky
mortgages on the securities market with little recourse for those purchases should the
borrowers default on their obligations.116
Another phenomenon that flows out of the lack of a strong bond between the
borrower and lender is the significant barriers to loss mediation when a borrower is
in distress and in danger of defaulting on his or her mortgage. In the traditional
model, a lender will have screened a potential borrower carefully given the shared
interest in the viability of the loan. That lender might have specialized knowledge
about the micro-economic climate in a neighborhood or town, and be able to make
an educated assessment about the prospective borrower’s long-term prospects.117
113
See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 56, at 1258-1259 (noting predatory lenders’
efforts to target prospective borrowers who are “disconnected” from the credit market due to
“historical credit rationing, discrimination, the exodus of banks from inner-city
neighborhoods, and other social and economic forces”); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor,
21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 133 (2004) (describing barriers to access to credit for those without
bank accounts).
114
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE AND THE DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 13 (1998), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf [hereinafter JOINT REPORT].
115
DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, TWO STEPS BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE
MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1999)
(noting lending disparities in Chicago were the result of the failure of mainstream lenders to
market to communities of color); Anthony Pennington-Cross et al., Credit Risk and Mortgage
Lending: Who Uses Subprime and Why? 14 (Research Inst. for Hous. Am., Working Paper
No. 00-03, 2000) (noting difference in subprime lending patterns a function of race and
ethnicity of borrowers).
116

Eggert Testimony, supra note 72, at 14; Engel & McCoy, supra note 56, at 1288-1289.

117

Of course, this assumes no discrimination or other kinds of steering on the part of the
lender.
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Furthermore, should those assessments prove incorrect—should there be an
economic downturn, a closing of a business or the flight of a company from the
area—the lender will know about it with some advance warning and will be able to
communicate with the borrower about prospects for maintaining that borrower’s
obligations under the loan. Short-term modifications of the loan could be made to
accommodate a temporary setback and long-term restructuring could be put in place,
or a planned sale of the property could occur, with enough lead time to preserve the
asset and the credit history of the borrower.
In the modern relationship, not only is there little communication between the
borrower and the servicer of the debt—other than the monthly mailing with a return
envelope for payment—the borrower might not even know the person to call when
he or she fears an economic setback will make delinquency a real possibility.
Furthermore, based on this lack of a relationship with or knowledge of the servicer,
and out of ignorance of the full consequences of default, a borrower might ignore
calls from the servicer or a collection agency inquiring about the borrower’s ability
to meet his or her obligations.118
There are also structural barriers to forbearance; as stated earlier, many
securitization agreements contain limits on the extent to which a servicer can
negotiate terms with a borrower in default, or might limit the percentage of loans in a
tranche that can be modified, and a servicer might receive compensation from the
holders of the securities based on the amount that is collected from the borrower.
In order to address the asymmetries of information, the weak relationships among
the parties, the absence of accountability levers in the market, and the limits on
negotiability, which are all failures of social capital, among other things, the
following is a discussion of the ways that the subprime mortgage market could be reinfused with social capital so that information sharing, trust and accountability can
be restored to a system that is all too often lacking in all three.
A. Mortgage Broker Accountability
In many instances, particularly with subprime borrowers who might not have a
pre-existing relationship with a lender, a prospective mortgagor’s first foray into the
mortgage market is guided by a mortgage broker. For the typical unsophisticated
borrower, the mortgage broker may hold the economic fate of the prospective
borrower in his or her hand. The prospective borrower relies on the mortgage broker
as an advisor, confidante, “fixer” and matchmaker. The borrower will often have the
mortgage process explained to him or her by the mortgage broker and that broker
will assess the creditworthiness and viability of the prospective borrower, will help
identify mortgage products and generally shepherd the borrower through the process,
from assisting him or her in gathering documentation of income and assets straight
through to the mortgage closing.
The mortgage broker therefore sits at a critical juncture in the process and
becomes not only a source of information about the process for the prospective
borrower, but also ultimately counsels the borrower on what he or she can afford and
identifies the mortgage product that, in the broker’s and lender’s opinion, is

118
John Leland, Swift Steps Help Avert Foreclosures in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, March 26,
2008, at A1 (noting a tendency of borrowers in default to ignore efforts of servicers to contact
those borrowers).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/4

32

2008]

CAPITAL IN CHAOS: THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS

303

appropriate for the borrower. Particularly when dealing with an unsophisticated
borrower, that borrower relies heavily on a broker’s counsel and will often assume
that the product identified for the borrower is the most advantageous for him or her.
As more fully described above, a mortgage broker in the subprime/securitization
market has incentives that do not always function to promote the best interests of the
borrower. A mortgage broker who is compensated each time a mortgage is
consummated, and is rarely held accountable—short of being held responsible for
outright acts of fraud, particularly for failing to follow disclosure requirements
imposed upon brokers—when those borrowers are delinquent, will obviously pursue
quantity over quality. Furthermore, they might not take the time to explore different
mortgage products to ensure that the borrower is entering into a loan that is in his or
her best interests, especially when taking such time to do so would take away from
that broker’s generating more loans, in pursuit of more compensation.119
Unfortunately, there are few legal limitations on the mortgage broker’s conduct,
apart from basic strictures outlawing outright fraud, and in only a few jurisdictions is
the broker considered a fiduciary of the borrower, despite the extent to which the
borrower might believe he or she can trust that broker. Indeed, in very few
jurisdictions are there statutes that explicitly impose a fiduciary relationship between
the broker and borrower,120 and only a few states have recognized a common law
duty, generally basing such duty on principles of agency law.121 In these ways,
119

A perfect example of the conflicting loyalties facing the broker is the so-called “yield
spread premium”: a payment made to the broker by the originator, for, in effect, convincing
the borrower to accept a loan that is more expensive than a loan that originator might
otherwise offer the borrower. If the broker is able to convince the borrower to accept the more
expensive loan (without telling that borrower that he or she could obtain the less expensive
loan), the originator will pay the broker the difference between the interest rate ultimately paid
by the borrower and that which the originator would have accepted. See, Howell E. Jackson &
Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 291-292 (2007).
120

See Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45, 50 (Cal. 1979) (finding, under
California Real Estate law and principles of agency law, that mortgage brokers owe fiduciary
duties to borrowers); see also Rede v. Great Am. First Sav. Bank, No. 95-55616, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 747, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997). Cf. MINN. STAT. §58.16(1), § 58.02(3),
.02(14), .02(19), .02(23) (2007) (setting forth duties owed between borrower and mortgage
originator, but including mortgage broker within definition of mortgage originator); MINN.
STAT. §58.16(2)(a)(2)-(a)(3) (2007) (imposing duty on broker to enter into a contract with the
borrower and describe whether the broker is to receive compensation from another source).
See also Grambart v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, Inc., Civ. No. 05-2416, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22565, at *4 (D. Minn. April 21, 2006) (referencing Minnesota statutory scheme). But cf.
Brancheau v. Residential Mortgage & Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, 182 F.R.D. 579, 588 (D.
Minn. 1998) (finding question of fiduciary relationship hinges on acts of parties reviewed
under principles of agency law); Shafer v. GSF Mortgage Corp., C1-02-1165, 2003 Minn.
App. LEXIS 550, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2003) (finding no fiduciary relationship exists
under state law between mortgage broker and borrower).
121
See Jones v. USMoney Source, Inc., No. 1:99–CV-1522A-JEC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20400, at *52 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 9, 2000) (finding fiduciary relationship between borrower and
broker under principles of agency law); McWhorter v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 33 F. Supp.
2d 1059, 1071 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (same); Vargas v. Universal Mortgage Corp., No. 01 C 0087,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6696, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2001) (construing Illinois law to find
that fiduciary relationship may exist based on agency law; construing principals of agency law
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structural social capital—the legal backdrop to human relations—typically does not
reinforce the expectations that the borrower may have that the broker will be acting
in his or her best interests.
What I propose here is that mortgage brokers assume this duty voluntarily, and,
consistent with other disclosure requirements,122 they must disclose to their
prospective clients whether they are agreeing to assume the role of fiduciary in
defense of the borrowers’ interests. A borrower can then have the choice of enlisting
the assistance of a broker who agrees to assume a fiduciary relationship to that
borrower. In this way we can ensure that borrowers have the choice of hiring
mortgage brokers that have agreed to place the interests of the borrower ahead of
their own interests.
The fiduciary obligation has elements that are deeply tied to trust, but also
includes proper sanctions and legal ramifications for breach of that trust. As
Professor Mitchell points out:
Ideally, and in its original design, [the] fiduciary obligation is selfenforcing. It is one of the few instances in our law where we levy a moral
injunction against an actor as such, holding the trustee legally accountable
to an otherwise aspirational standard of conduct that depends for its
efficacy on the good faith of the actor.123
to determine whether fiduciary relationship may exist between mortgage broker and
borrower); Epps v. The Money Store, Inc., No. 96 C 2703, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17964, at
*20 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1997) (permitting “inference” of fiduciary relationship between broker
and borrower based on principles of agency law); Tomlin v. Dylan Mortgage Inc., No. 99
CVS 3551, 2000 NCBC LEXIS 11, at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct, June 12, 2000) (finding question
of fact existed whether mortgage broker owed fiduciary duty to borrower under principles of
fiduciary law). See also Barker v. Altegra Credit Co., 251 B.R. 250, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2000) (finding fiduciary relationship existed between mortgage broker and borrower under
principles of agency law); McGlawn v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 891 A.2d 757, 769
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (same). But cf. Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d
1136, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (finding no fiduciary relationship between broker and
borrower under Washington law).
122

The most important federal statutes that cover disclosure requirements concerning the
mortgage transaction, are the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2006) (TILA),
and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. §§2601-17 (2006) (RESPA).
While RESPA deals mostly with disclosure of closing costs, TILA deals primarily with
disclosures about the cost associated with the deal itself, i.e., the interest rate and finance
charge. So-called Regulation Z, which implements the requirements of TILA, sets forth a
series of disclosure requirements imposed upon the creditor, see, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §226.18
(2006), but imposes no disclosure requirements on brokers. The Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a)-(b) (2006) (HOEPA), which
amended TILA, and the regulations of which are also found in Regulation Z, require
additional disclosures for “high cost”, closed-end mortgages (with interest rates that exceed a
certain amount). At the time of publication, the Federal Reserve has proposed changes to
Regulation Z in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, one of which will lower the
“trigger” of HOEPA with respect to the interest rate to which it applies, but still has not sought
to impose any fiduciary duties on brokers. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672 (Jan. 9,
2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
123

Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 614-615
(2001).
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By assuming a fiduciary duty to the borrower, the broker will act solely in the
best interests of the borrower, and with the “utmost good faith.”124 Such a duty will
prohibit self-dealing, conflicts-of-interest, and shoddy and incomplete research into
the market.125 The very act of assuming this duty voluntarily will signal to the
borrower that this broker can be trusted, and can be held accountable for violations
of that trust.126 Given the inability of the borrower to monitor all of the actions of the
broker, fiduciary law offers an appropriate response in this situation: one that will
protect the borrower while not imposing restrictions that would result in honest
brokers leaving the market.127
What flows from such an enhanced relationship, admittedly, is that there might
be loans that will not be made, because the mortgage broker will have a frank
discussion with the prospective borrower about that borrower’s obligations, and
prospects for compliance with such obligations. And there are some loans that
simply should not be made because the borrower will be worse off should he or she
default on them. In the end, by inviting brokers to assume a fiduciary responsibility
towards borrowers, and to tell them when they will not, we will restore some
effective checks and balances into the system, altering the incentive structure that has
put short-term profits well ahead of long-term economic viability. In this way,
“bridging” social capital can assist in overcoming asymmetries of information
present in many mortgage transactions,128 and permit the broker—voluntarily—to
124

For an overview of fiduciary obligations, see Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W. Pratt
& Richard Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795
(1983).
125
For an analysis that suggests that a “duty of best execution” should be imposed on loan
originators that would require that the originator offer the most suitable loan to the borrower,
see, Howell E. Jackson, Enlisting Market Mechanisms to Police the Origination of Home
Mortgages, HARV. U., JOINT CENTER ON HOUSING STUDIES, Policy Paper UCC08-7, February
2008, at 12, available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/whatsnew/new_pubs.html.
126

See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 1796 (arguing fiduciary law “frames”
relationships to encourage the internalization of behavior worthy of trust). For an argument
for why brokers should not be fiduciaries of their client-borrowers, see David Unseth, Note,
What Level of Fiduciary Duty Should Mortgage Brokers Owe Their Borrowers? 75 WASH. U.
L. Q. 1737 (1997).
127
Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 1788 (noting wide-spread recognition that situations
where the principal cannot monitor the agent are appropriate for the imposition of fiduciary
duties) (citations omitted).
128

In studies that have looked at the impact of social capital on the success of lending
programs, research shows that a high level of trust between borrower and lender is positively
related to the success of such programs, and high levels of social capital help overcome
asymmetries of information, especially in the micro-lending context where building vertical
social capital between the borrower and lender is seen as a priority. See, e.g., Asif Dowla, In
Credit We Trust: Building Social Capital by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, 35 J. OF SOCIOECON. 102 (2006); Grootaert & Bastelaer, supra note 11, at 20; Narayan, supra note 4, at 38;
Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841 (1999);
Alexander Goldmark, Fewer Loans for the Lonely: Can Social Capital Improve Access to
Credit for the Poor?, 9 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 49, 53 (2003). In addition, the length and
quality of the relationship between borrower and lender also matter; one recent report
analyzing information from domestic credit unions showed that the longer-term members of
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assume a fiduciary relationship to the borrower. This voluntary act alone will help to
restore confidence in the broker and the process.
B. Community Education and Neighborhood-Based Good Will
Prospective borrowers and borrowers in distress might have similar social capital
profiles, i.e., they have nowhere to turn for information and counseling that might
help them navigate the mortgage process. Prospective borrowers, particularly those
with little knowledge about the mortgage process, need a wide range of information
in order to determine whether homeownership is right for them. Prospective
borrowers whose horizontal contacts might have little information themselves about
the mortgage process need a source for critical information about that process, so
that they can determine if they are viable candidates for a mortgage. They need to be
able to make an objective assessment of their income, assets, long-term economic
prospects, credit history and what size and type of mortgage they can afford. This
lack of knowledge—this structural social capital failure—helped lead many
borrowers to subprime loans they could not ultimately afford.
Pre-purchase counseling that provides basic education on the mortgage process,
which might also include counseling on budgeting and financial planning, is critical
for these prospective borrowers. Homeownership counselors can provide low cost
information to non-traditional markets, cross cultural and linguistic barriers, bridge
the knowledge gap in non-traditional markets, assist lenders in meeting their
requirements under the Community Reinvestment Act, and identify worthy
A growing body of evidence shows that community-based
borrowers.129
organizations that have entered this area are having a beneficial effect on default
rates.130
these credit unions had better repayment rates of micro-loans than did new members. See
Marva Williams, Cooperative Credit: How Community Development Credit Unions are
Meeting the Need for Affordable, Short-Term Credit, WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE (2007), available
at http://www.economicintegrity.org/pdf/cooperativecredit_may2007_williams-1.pdf.
129

Steven P. Hornburg, Strengthening the Case for Homeownership Counseling: Moving
Beyond “A Little Bit of Knowledge” 9 HARV. U., JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES,
Working Paper No. W04-12, 2004), available at http://www.nw.org/network/training/
homeownership/documents/StrengtheningCaseforHomeownershipCounseling.pdf; see also
George W. McCarthy & Roberto G. Quercia, Bridging the Gap between Supply and Demand:
The Evolution of Homeownership, Education and Counseling Industry, RES. INST. FOR HOUS.
AM., REP. NO. 00-01 (2000), available at http://www.housingamerica.org/Publications/48506
_BridgingtheGapBetweenSupplyandDemand.pdf.
130

See, e.g., Roberto G. Quercia & Susan M. Wachter, Homeownership Counseling
Performance: How Can It Be Measured?, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 175 (1996), available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_0701_quercia.pdf (showing that
pre-purchase counseling can help identify viable borrowers, assist in budgeting and managing
debt repayment, and help navigate potential crises); Abdighani Hirad & Peter M. Zorn, A
Little Knowledge is a Good Thing: Empirical Evidence of the Effectiveness of Pre-Purchase
Homeownership Counseling, HARV. U., JOINT CENTER. FOR HOUSING STUDIES, Working Paper
No. LIHO-01.4, 2001, available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeowner
ship/liho 01-4.pdf (studying 40,000 mortgages to individuals at 100% of the median income in
an area where pre-purchase home counseling was undertaken and showing that individual
home mortgage counseling had the effect of reducing 90-day delinquencies by 34 percent);
Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Cost-Effectiveness of Community-Based Foreclosure
Prevention, HARV. U., JOINT CENTER. FOR HOUSING STUDIES, Working Paper No. BABC 04-
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When community-based organizations enter into this area, they will generally
already enjoy the trust of the communities they serve. They can leverage the social
capital they have developed—the bonds of trust and the good will and respect they
have garnered over the years—to improve their constituents’ knowledge about the
mortgage process and market so that they can find the product that is right for the
borrower. They can also help to winnow out individuals who, because of poor credit
history or insufficient or irregular income, might be bad candidates for a mortgage.
In addition, community-based organizations can assist servicers in identifying
and communicating with borrowers in distress, and the good will they have
developed can generate a better response than a dunning phone call or threatening
letter from a servicer or collection agency. There is a growing recognition that an
aggressive approach to mortgage collection is less likely to lead to positive
outcomes. As a recent survey of mortgage lenders from the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) found, banks agree that a “friendlier approach”
to borrowers in distress, through which the contact rate with these borrowers is
increased, is “the key to success of their foreclosure prevention initiatives,” contrary
to the “old method” of “flood[ing] borrowers” with harassing letters and phone
calls.131 Furthermore, as the OCC explains:
Some servicers have realized that counseling agencies are more trusted by
borrowers and that borrowers may be more likely to respond to a call or
letter from a counseling agency. These servicers have found that by
partnering with a counseling agency, their contact rates with delinquent
borrowers have increased. These partnerships capitalize on the desire of
both the banks and counseling agencies to have borrowers stay in their
homes if they can afford their mortgage payments.132
Community-based organizations recognize the impact the positive effect
homeownership can have on the communities they serve, and the negative
externalities of foreclosure. More and more, banks are realizing that “keeping
homeowners in their homes is the best way to mitigate credit loss, preserve customer
relations, maintain stable neighborhoods, and minimize the detrimental effects
vacant properties can have on crime and property values.”133
18, 2004, available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/babc/babc_04-18.pdf
(finding lower mortgage delinquency rates for recipients of post-purchase credit counseling).
131
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURE, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FORECLOSURE
PREVENTION: IMPROVING CONTACT WITH BORROWERS, INSIGHTS 3-4, 9 (June 2007), http://
www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/Foreclosure_Prevention_Insights.pdf [hereinafter OCC: IMPROVING
CONTACT].
132

Id., at 6.

133

Id., at 2. Lenders should be interested in avoiding foreclosure because of the reputation
risk, the cost to lender-owned portfolios, the costs of servicing a foreclosed property,
diminished property values, and the impact of rampant foreclosures on Community
Reinvestment Act ratings. Id. at 2-3. A representative of Moody’s bond rating agency
recently testified concerning the value of negotiating to preserve homeownership
arrangements and avoid foreclosure as follows:
Moody’s believes that restrictions in securitizations which limit a servicer’s flexibility
to modify distressed loans are generally not beneficial to the holders of the bonds.
Loan modifications, when used judiciously, can mitigate losses on mortgage loans and
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Because pre-purchase counseling works and post-purchase counseling can help
stave off foreclosure, greater resources should be directed at strengthening the home
counseling network and community-based organizations should be given
opportunities to enter into this arena if they are not in it already.134 Lenders and
servicers should be encouraged to partner with community-based organizations to
conduct outreach to borrowers, and should not just be required to give notice of their
availability to a borrower in default.135 For first-time homebuyers and borrowers that
might otherwise be seen as risky investments, pre- and post-purchase counseling
should be integrated into the lending process, and lenders should coordinate their
efforts with community-based organizations to build on and leverage the social
capital in the communities these organizations serve.136
One structural barrier to enhancing the role of community-based organizations in
the pre- and post-purchase lending process is the effect of privacy laws that might
otherwise prevent the lender from communicating the status of a debt to a third party.
This communication could be facilitated by offering borrowers, at closing, the
opportunity to give advance consent to the lender/servicer to enlist a local
community-based organization of the borrower’s choice should that borrower enter
into delinquency or face distress.137
C. Foreclosure, Problem-Solving Courts and Community Mediation
In approximately half of the states, the parties to a mortgage transaction may
agree that a judicial act is not required for a mortgagee to foreclose on a property
when the mortgagor is in default.138 Virtually all states provide a formal judicial
mechanism of foreclosure when a mortgagor is in default, and that mortgagor must
receive formal notice of the pendency of the action and be afforded an opportunity to
respond. Judicial foreclosure is the exclusive remedy in approximately forty percent
increase the likelihood that bonds will be paid. Consequently, while loan
modifications can not eliminate losses or generate more credit enhancement for a
given transaction, we believe that they can typically have positive credit implications
for securities backed by subprime mortgage loans.
Kornfeld Testimony, supra note 65, at 17-18.
134

See, e.g., REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET
BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS, HARV. U., JOINT
CENTER. FOR HOUSING STUDIES (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
finance/mm07-1_mortgage_market_behavior.pdf (suggesting the creation of a network of
“trusted advisors” that would build on the trust and good will community-based organizations
have established in the communities they serve).
135

See 15 U.S.C. §1692(a)–(p) (2006).

136

See MARK WIRANOWSKI, SUSTAINING HOME OWNERSHIP THROUGH EDUCATION AND
COUNSELING, HARV. U., JOINT CENTER, FOR HOUSING STUDIES (2003), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/w03-7_wiranowski.pdf (arguing for
a comprehensive approach to counseling, that assists borrowers from the pre-purchase stage
through post-purchase and any threatened delinquency, that is also integrated into the lending
process).
137

OCC: IMPROVING CONTACT, supra note 137, at 8-9, 11.

138

Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L.
REV. 489, 492 (1991) (citations omitted).
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of the states.139 Unfortunately for many subprime borrowers, they cannot afford an
attorney to defend them in such an action, and the complicated defenses that might
be available are often too difficult to raise without an attorney. In addition, defenses
such as fraud in the inducement, or that the loan might violate predatory lending
laws, might be impossible to interpose against servicers or holders of the note after
securitization due to the “holder in due course” doctrine.140
Furthermore, when courts are engaged in the foreclosure process, the actions are
usually filed wherever venue is appropriate, and matters are scattered throughout the
court system, without concentrating them before a single judge or a group of judges
with expertise in the law or knowledge about a particular lender, borrower or
community. Unlike specialized courts that often handle landlord-tenant matters,
where the laws are often just as arcane as in the mortgage transaction area, judges
handling foreclosure actions are usually generalists and rarely have an expertise in
this area of the law. Moreover, when foreclosure actions affecting a community are
spread throughout a court system, little attention can be paid to the community
consequences of foreclosures in a particular neighborhood.
Given the structural deficiencies of such an approach to foreclosure actions, in
jurisdictions where judicial intervention is required to complete a mortgage
foreclosure, consideration should be given to channeling foreclosure actions before a
specialized court that would be equipped to take into account (1) the complexities of
foreclosure litigation and the defenses that might be available to mortgagors; (2) the
availability of counseling, loss mitigation services and mediation in the community;
and (3) the impacts of foreclosures on specific neighborhoods and communities.141
Courts would also build their own social capital by developing an ethic of
accountability among the litigants by playing a monitoring function, ensuring that
parties that have entered into an agreement to permit forbearance abide by the terms
of the agreement.
In addition, and viewing matters from a social capital perspective, judges
handling these matters would get to know the parties and their lawyers, who will
likely appear before the court regularly. As a result, they can develop a dense social
network of mutual cooperation and obligation: what one commentator calls “thick

139
GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 558 (4th ed.,
West Group 2001) (noting judicial foreclosure is available in every jurisdiction but the
“exclusive or generally used method” in forty percent of states); see also FORECLOSURE LAW &
RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST (Sidney A. Keyles ed., 1995) (cataloguing
state procedures); Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An Evaluation
of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229 (1998) (describing foreclosure
remedies).
140

See Eggert, supra note 38. Further complicating matters, because investors are shielded
from liability from any predatory terms that might arise in the underlying mortgage, there is
little ability to police such terms where the originator may no longer exist due to bankruptcy or
other dissolution. See, e.g., Kiff & Mills, supra note 40, at 11-12.
141

For a discussion of a community court’s experience with taking into account the
neighborhood context of court sanctions, see Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the
Process of Accountability: Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice
Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1581-82 (2003).
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trust.”142 In this way, the lawyers regularly appearing before this court will “have
reputations at stake that are almost surely worth more than gains from momentary
treachery.”143
In this way, the judicial system could build on the work of other “problemsolving courts.” This phenomenon has expanded in recent years with a number of
approaches, handling for example, low-level and first offense drug crimes, domestic
violence and misdemeanor and/or criminal level offenses committed in a particular
community.144 These courts approach the problems they are designed to face by
utilizing principles of “therapeutic justice,”145 as court personnel become aware of
both the community impacts of the issues they are designed to address as well as the
community supports available to the litigants to reduce those harmful impacts.146 At
142

Bernard Williams, Formal Structures and Social Reality, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 3-13 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1998). For a description of
efforts of judges to develop the trust of prosecutors, defense counsel, criminal defendants,
mental health professionals and community-based social services providers in a criminal
setting, see Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental
Health Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 587 (2005); see also Judith S. Kaye, Delivering
Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 142 (2004)
(arguing problem-solving courts are restoring litigants’ trust in the legal system).
143

PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 136. The connection between law, trust and problem-solving
courts has been well-recognized in at least one arena: problem-solving courts are often seen as
restoring the public’s faith in the legal system itself. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of
the State of N. Y., Keynote Address at the Eleventh Annual Symposium on Contemporary
Urban Challenges: Problem-Solving Courts (Feb. 28, 2002), in 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1925,
1928 (2002) (arguing that problem-solving justice “is an opportunity to restore trust and
confidence that the courts are indeed concerned with producing meaningful results, not simply
proliferating legal process”); Roger K. Warren, Public Trust and Procedural Justice, 37 CT.
REV. 12, 15 (2000) (arguing improved perceived procedural fairness of problem-solving courts
can improve public trust in the legal system).
144
For a description of such problem-solving courts, see GREG BERMAN & JOHN
FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 31 (2005); Michael C.
Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2003).
145

“Therapeutic jurisprudence,” or “judging with an ethic of care,” has typically been seen
as a worthwhile approach to utilize in settings where courts might work to address
psychological forces that might prove resistant to change through punitive measures, as in
drug prosecutions involving someone who is mentally ill and chemically addicted. See, e.g.,
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 9 (Bruce J.
Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003). There is no reason why an “ethic of care” could not
be utilized to minimize the impact of foreclosures on the courts, the litigants and the
community. For a description of the therapeutic role of courts of general jurisdiction, see
William G. Schma, Judging for the New Millenium, 37 CT. REV. 4, 6 (2000) (“A trial court
that moves deliberately in response to emergent issues is a stabilizing force in society and acts
consistently with its role of maintaining the rule of law.”).
146

The ability to connect litigants to needed social services, which might be appropriate for
some subprime borrowers, is often a feature of problem-solving courts. Bruce J. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1061
(2003) (describing role of social services in problem-solving courts); Greg Berman & John
Feinblatt, Problem Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125, 131-132 (2001)
(same).
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present there are over approximately 2000 such problem-solving courts throughout
the country, though none in the area of mortgage foreclosure.147
Even in jurisdictions that permit foreclosures to occur without judicial
intervention, more resources could be directed—perhaps even subsidized by lending
institutions—towards making community mediation more available to lenders
saddled with borrowers in default. These mediators could enjoy the respect of the
community in general and the borrowers in particular, and might bring borrowers in
default to the negotiating table more readily than servicers pursuing their debts.
IV. LAW, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND TRUST
As the previous discussion shows, the subprime mortgage crisis is, in many ways,
the product of a market in transition. Deregulation,148 the spread of mortgage
products to previously untapped markets, the increase in available mortgage products
and lenders, and the influx of capital through securitization that resulted in the
globalization of the home mortgage market: these all came together in a “perfect
storm.” With the severance of the traditional borrower-lender relationship, which
undermined the value that social capital brought to that relationship, potential
borrowers who might not have had sufficient contacts or networks on which to rely
for information about the mortgage process were victimized by brokers and lenders
looking for a quick payday through the securitization process.
Some have instituted litigation to try to weed out and punish brokers and lenders
Congress, the Bush
who discriminated against subprime borrowers.149
Administration and some banks have explored potential responses to the subprime
mortgage crisis, though much of them have the air of palliative care: making the
inevitable less painful, if not less swift. Furthermore, the Bush Administration’s
recently announced proposed changes to the manner in which the federal government
regulates financial markets indicate that, while expanding the scope of covered
entities and practices is one goal of those changes, further deregulation and federal
pre-emption are still driving forces behind the proposal.150 As this volume goes to
print, however, because of the political fallout from the Fed’s intervention in the
collapse of financial giant Bear Stearns, bi-partisan support seems to be mounting on
Capital Hill for more serious interventions in the subprime market, notably
increasing funding support for housing counseling: a development that is certainly
welcome and might indicate more comprehensive reforms are possible.151

147

BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 147, at 32. Recently, a working group has formed of
trial court judges in Brooklyn, NY, through which these judges are able to share information
about trends in their foreclosure dockets. Mark Fass, Judges Take the Reins in Brooklyn
Foreclosures, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 25, 2008.
148

See supra Part II.C.

149

See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Baltimore is Suing Bank Over Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, January 8, 2008, at A12; Christopher Maag, Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders Over Subprime
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, January 12, 2008, at A9.
150

Edmund L. Andrews, Treasury’s Plan Would Give Fed Wide New Power, N.Y. TIMES,
March 29, 2008, at A1.
151

David Herzenhorn, In Senate, Agreement on Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2008, at D1.
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What can the absence of legal protections tell us about the effect of law on this
market? Prior to this market’s collapse, many might have hailed the triumph of
deregulation and economic markets over attempts to legislate against discrimination.
The loosening of restrictions on certain types of lending through deregulation,
federal pre-emption of some state efforts to combat predatory lending,152 and a web
of laws designed to discourage “old fashioned” discrimination in mortgage lending,
encouraged subprime lending in previously “redlined” communities. Subprime
lenders filled that void and exploited that market. And thus, discrimination in
mortgage lending was no longer a problem. A strong housing market was the
solution to housing discrimination. Lending disparities in communities of color were
a result of lenders concerned about their bottom line, not motivated by bias against
borrowers or certain communities. Let the market do its job and discrimination will
turn out to be inefficient. At least that was the theory.153
It is true that the relentless drive to securitize pushed lenders into previously
underserved communities in an effort to maximize profits. Tragically, the brokers
and lenders who brought these products to these communities found themselves with
both an informational advantage over their customers and with no accountability to
their investors. Ultimately, this mix has proven toxic. And the laws designed to root
out discriminatory practices have proven dull weapons against “reverse redlining”:
the infusion of mortgage products in previously underserved markets.154 Indeed,
laws like HMDA and the Community Reinvestment Act are designed, respectively,
to monitor, through disclosure, mortgage rejection and approval patterns and the
failure of covered banks to meet the credit needs of the communities they serve. In
these ways, they primarily target the failure of banks to extend loan products to
communities of color. The Fair Housing Act, on the other hand, although its primary
purpose is to prohibit the rejection of loan applications based on race, also prohibits
the imposition of different and less favorable loan terms based on the race of the
borrower. In litigation under the FHA, however, as with many other anti152
See Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory
Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (2004) (describing efforts by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency to pre-empt some state anti-predatory lending laws).
153

See, e.g., GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957) (arguing that
discrimination is inefficient and free markets, not regulation, will eliminate it); Jeffrey W.
Gunther, Should CRA Stand for “Community Redundancy Act”?, 23 REG. 56 (2000) (arguing
market forces, and not the CRA, can best promote lending in previously underserved
communities). For a critique of the argument that free markets will eliminate discrimination,
see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 155-57 (1997). See also IAN
AYRES, THE ELUSIVE NATURE OF DISCRIMINATION: PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL
EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2003) (identifying discriminatory conduct
in many economic settings).
154
Although identified for over a decade, there are few reported cases where courts have
found, on the merits, that a broker or lender was engaged in so-called “reverse redlining”. See,
e.g., Barkle v. Olypmia Mortgage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61940 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 22, 2007)
(finding allegations of targeting of minority borrowers for less favorable loan terms sufficient
to withstand motion to dismiss); Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp.2d
874, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (same); Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d
7, 20-22 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding allegations of targeting of minority borrowers for less
favorable loan terms sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment).
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discrimination laws in the area of mortgage discrimination, causation is often
difficult to prove.155
Deregulation and a legacy of mortgage discrimination meant that there were
certain communities that were likely targets for new mortgage products and
aggressive lenders. Given the nature of anti-discrimination laws that were designed
primarily to prevent mortgage rejections, a Community Reinvestment Act that was
easily circumvented, and a cadre of mortgage purveyors that were largely
unconstrained, unsophisticated borrowers from previously untapped markets fell
prey to the promise of homeownership through subprime products. When the
subprime lenders did come to town, borrowers could not rely on networks of
information from other borrowers to help them steer clear of harmful loan terms.
Trust was present in all of these transactions: too much trust, and trust that was not
backed up by law. In these ways, the legal institutions in place were not designed for
the changes that occurred, leaving a legal vacuum.
Perhaps tightly knit communities with deeply embedded norms of trust and
cooperation can function well without much recourse to the law.156 But in markets in
transition, where traditional relationships of trust have broken down and been
replaced by more impersonal communications and where the laws in place do not
respond to the changes in these relationships, norms of trust and the sanctions that
might otherwise enforce them prove illusory. Information asymmetries and the
prospect of moral hazard abound. Without a legal response to such market
transformations, where law can help to shore up these relationships in transition and
insulate them from the harsh consequences of the departure of social capital, trust is
replaced by predation.
Law can restore trust, and with it, social capital, however: in one example, by the
creation of fiduciary duties that may help to offset information asymmetries. Market
responses like better consumer education can also help to offset such market
distortions. Judicial responses that attempt to rebuild social capital in dispute
resolution—like the problem-solving courts described here—can also help rectify
structural impediments to negotiations to reach mutually beneficial ends.
Are there other markets to which this analysis may be helpful? One close cousin
to the subprime mortgage market is the consumer credit market. In a small town or
tightly knit community, a local merchant might be willing to extend credit to
customers he or she knows or trusts. Such a merchant will only permit such credit to
grow so high, and will rein in customers seeking to take advantage of good will. At
the same time, low-income communities and communities of color have long
suffered from the high price of consumer credit, through rent-to-own schemes and
contracts of adhesion. With deregulation, consumers are overwhelmed by credit card
offers, and the working poor are all too often saddled with high cost consumer debt.

155

See, e.g., Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit: Examining the Structural
Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233, 241, n.44 (2006) (describing
challenges to bringing litigation to raise claims of discrimination brought about by predatory
lending practices); Barr, supra note 41, at 626-627 (identifying difficulties in proving
discriminatory treatment in extension of mortgage credit).
156
For example, order can be maintained without law in the cattle-raising communities of
Shasta County, California, as described by Professor Ellickson. See ELLICKSON, supra note
24.
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While deregulation might have made consumer credit readily available, the
consequences of such debt, and the long-term impacts of the profligate consumer
spending of the first half of the 2000s, are now becoming apparent. Could the
consumer credit market turn into the next market in crisis?157 Are there steps that
could be taken today to attempt to ameliorate the high cost of credit before the rapid
increase of consumer debt has an adverse effect on the economy, like a rapid and
vast contraction of consumer spending, the beginnings of which we are probably
already seeing? Does social capital have an answer to this looming crisis? A look at
one area of consumer credit that seems to have benefited from the creation of social
capital certainly suggests that it is possible.
Grameen Bank is generally acknowledged as the pioneer in micro-finance, and
has brought about lasting change for millions of people throughout the world who
have benefited from loans from Grameen Bank (Grameen) itself and its many
imitators. This recognition met its climax, perhaps, when Grameen’s founder,
Muhammad Yunus, was awarded the Nobel Peace prize for his groundbreaking work
in poverty alleviation. The Grameen model, replicated the world over with varying
degrees of success, finds at its core a fundamental reliance on the creation, nurturing
and maintenance of social capital among its participants. The term “participants” is
critical here, as opposed to borrowers, because those individuals who seek loans
through a lender following the Grameen model must become a part of a small
network of prospective borrowers. These individuals form a “lending circle” and
decide on who shall join the circle, determine who should get the benefit of a loan
first, what the terms of that loan should be, and how the income stream from that
loan should be transformed into a loan for another member of the circle.158
The whole system is one built on trust, mutual interdependence and shared goals.
All members of the circle are collectively responsible for repayment of each loan,
creating peer pressure and mutual dependence. These aspects of the process are
reinforced through highly structured rituals that tend to strengthen bonds among
individuals who, but for their participation in such an endeavor, are often highly
marginalized and isolated, with few opportunities for building relationships beyond
their own families. These rituals include regular and formal meetings, attendance at
which is mandatory; a reliance on rotating leadership roles; and even the simple act
of requiring that participants call each other by their first name, a practice
uncommon in some patrilineal societies where women are typically addressed by
their married name only. Grameen staff bend over backwards to develop trust with
participants, including striving to express genuine concern for their well being,
especially in times of crisis and natural disaster.159 In the end, the more these

157

Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past Subprime Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A1 (noting increased delinquencies in other areas of consumer credit,
like credit card debt and auto loans).
158

For a general description of the Grameen approach, see MUHAMMAD YUNUS, GRAMEEN
BANK: EXPERIENCES AND REFLECTIONS (1998).
159

For an analysis of the social capital features of the Grameen model, see Dowla, supra
note 128, at 102; Lisa Young Larance, Fostering Social Capital through NGO Design:
Grameen Bank Membership in Bangladesh, 44 INT’L SOC. WORK 7 (2001); Thierry van
Bastelaer, Does Social Capital Facilitate the Poor’s Access to Credit? A Review of the
Microeconomic Literature (World Bank Soc. Cap. Initiative, Working Paper No. 9, 2000),
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organizations following the Grameen model are able to utilize its social capital
features, the more successful they have been and the stronger the relationship
between bank staff and participants, the better the loan repayment rate.160
Would increased consumer counseling in the area of consumer debt improve
borrowers’ chances for repayment and lower the ultimate cost of their credit?
Studies in the mortgage counseling area would seem to suggest that. Could
community-based lenders, i.e., Community Development Financial Institutions like
credit unions and other community-based financial institutions, make micro-loans to
consumers in debt to help them pay off their consumer debt?161 Could such lenders
institute social capital building features into their programs that might make
repayment more likely? Pilot programs seeking to institute the Grameen model in the
United States have met with limited success, but more research into what type or
types of micro-credit programs might work in the U.S. market is certainly needed.162
Another area that has seen explosive growth and a legal system ill-equipped to
handle it is the issue of immigration reform in the United States. For the last twenty
years, an influx of undocumented workers has created an underground economy in
the United States where low-wage, immigrant workers work in the shadows, often
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/SocialCapital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-08.pdf.
160

The importance of trust and social capital in the micro-finance area, as exemplified by
the Grameen Bank model, cannot be underestimated. As noted in Dowla, supra note 128, at
108:
Grameen Bank proved that the poor can be trusted and, with proper incentives and
institutional structures they will take advantage of the assistance. The Bank’s trust in
its members has created a realization among them that they have to reciprocate by
repaying the loans on time. The mere fact that the bank has placed its trust in the poor
makes them feel obligated, and this makes it harder for them to betray that trust.
161

The Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) movement in the United
States seeks, among other things, to improve the functioning of financial markets in previously
underserved communities. The CDFI Act, by increasing the availability of federal funds to
support such institutions, greatly enhanced the ability of this movement to address the
financial needs of low- and moderate-income communities. See Community Development
Financial Institutions Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 101-121, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified at
12 U.S.C. 4701-4718 (2001)). For an overview of the history of the CDFI movement in the
United States, see Nellie R. Santiago, Thomas T. Holyoke & Ross D. Levi, Turning David and
Goliath Into the Odd Couple: How the New Community Reinvestment Act Promotes
Community Development Financial Institutions, 6 J.L. & Pol’y 571, 595-609 (1998); Rochelle
Lento, Community Development Banking Strategy for Revitalizing Our Communities, 27 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 773 (1994). For an analysis of the CDFI Act, see Christopher Jordan
Heisin, Community Development Lite: An Economic Analysis of the Community Development
Financial Institutions Act, 39 How. L.J. 337 (1995).
162
For a review of the micro-finance movement generally, see Jonathan Morduch, The
Microfinance Promise, 37 J. OF ECON. LIT. 1569 (1999). Some question the viability of the
Grameen Bank model generally and its application in the United States. See, e.g., Rashmi
Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West has Misperceived the Grameen
Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217 (2005); Louise A. Howells, The
Dimensions of Microenterprise: A Critical Look at Microenterprise as a Tool to Alleviate
Poverty, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 161, 161 (2000) (critiquing
application of micro-credit model to poverty alleviation in the United States).
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afraid to raise issues about mistreatment, unsafe work conditions and illegal wages
for fear that their undocumented status will be revealed.163 Similarly, undocumented
immigrants are often afraid to report crime, to seek medical assistance and to
participate in the mainstream economy by doing things like open bank accounts for
want of proper identification and fear of prosecution.164 It is unquestionable that
formal legal protections that may shield immigrants in many situations165 are often
unenforceable because immigrants are afraid to vindicate what rights they may have
for fear that the legal system cannot truly protect them. Structural social capital—
formal legal institutions and laws that might promote civic participation and
collective action—has failed to provide adequate protections to undocumented
immigrant workers to permit them to integrate into the community as full
participants and has created a lawless sector, where employers can act with virtual
impunity and immigrants cannot partake of the full benefits of society. There are
examples of progressive reform in this area, however, where legal institutions are
being designed to promote trust and integrate immigrant communities into society.
In New York City, Executive Order 41 allows undocumented immigrants access to
social services by making immigration status confidential information.166 In New
Haven, a municipal identification system has been put in place that, among other
things, will encourage integration of undocumented immigrants into the life of the
city.167 While countered by anti-immigrant legislation and policies across the
country, these efforts provide an example of effective formal mechanisms that can
help promote trust and integration, and thereby foster the creation of social capital.

163
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO
IMMIGRATION ISSUES (2007), available at http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/
Publications/PoliceChiefsGuidetoImmigration.pdf (noting importance of building trust
between local law enforcement agencies and immigrant communities to combat crime in those
communities effectively); HANNAH GLADSTEIN, ET AL., BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE OF
STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME
INFORMATION CENTER DATA BASE 2002-2004, 11 (2005), available at http://www.migration
policy.org/pubs/MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf
(describing
criticism
of
enforcement of immigration laws by local law enforcement officials because it leads to
diminished trust and greater fear of the police). For an overview of current immigrant labor
issues, see JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
(2005).
164

See, e.g., Francine J. Lipman, Taxing Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal,
and Without Representation, 59 TAX L. 813, 857 (2006) (arguing that undocumented workers
pay more into the government than the services they receive).
165
See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 509-511 (2004) (reviewing labor law protections that are available to
workers regardless of immigration status). To protect workers from having to reveal their
immigration status when they seek claims where their immigration status is irrelevant, courts
have granted protective orders to prevent discovery of immigration status. See, e.g., Zeng Liu
v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Flores v. Amigon,
233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
166

Exec. Order No. 41, The City of New York Office of the Mayor, (Sept. 17, 2003),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/exe_order_41.pdf.
167

Cara Rubinsky, City OKs ID Card for Illegal Migrants, CHI TRIB., June 5, 2007, at 6.
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V. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the subprime mortgage market shows that the manner in which it
developed in the early part of this decade invited abuse. It permitted mortgage
brokers and lenders to promote their own interests with little regard for the
ramifications, whether it was packaging a mortgage for a borrower who could not
afford it, or selling such doomed-to-fail mortgages on the securitization market, with
little recourse. Once those mortgages entered the securitization market, they were
harder to re-negotiate, and borrowers and those holding the interest in the mortgage
have had a harder time accommodating the needs of the borrower in default. Given
this structure, it is easy to see that the subprime mortgage market created its own
crisis, with borrowers and investors left holding the bag.
From a social capital perspective, this structure, so ripe for abuse, dashed any
hope for trust, mutual dependence and accountability to play a meaningful role in
monitoring the problems embedded in the system. It is respectfully submitted that
the reforms suggested here—mortgage broker accountability, greater homeowner
education, and the introduction of specialized courts to handle foreclosures—offer
ways to re-introduce norms of trust and accountability to the system. As such, they
offer solutions grounded in social capital theory that can begin to address these
defects and help strengthen the market, improve the current state of affairs and avoid
the next crisis.
The modest proposals suggested here are not meant to offer a broad-based
solution to the subprime mortgage crisis. This study of the role that trust and the
absence of trust played in the subprime market’s collapse offers an opportunity to
test social capital theory, and review ways that social capital theory can restore trust
to a market where it is sorely needed. More sweeping responses to the crisis have
been proposed,168 and are most certainly needed. On the global, macro-economic
stage, trust in our financial institutions—as mediated by effective government
oversight and legitimate constraints on predatory and reckless behavior—is also
needed to restore confidence in the financial system and convince investment capital
that it is safe to enter the water once again. If the subprime market’s collapse tells us
anything, it is that trust, backed up by law, is an essential component of a
functioning, efficient and robust system of finance and investment.
The mortgage market, when it functioned well, operated on personal contacts and
relationships of trust and mutual interdependence. These bonds helped to identify
unreasonable risks and untenable contracts. The transition of the mortgage market
from local in nature to one with global reach, with international investors purchasing
bundles of mortgages for properties in every corner of the United States, severed
these bonds, inviting the abuses detailed in this piece. The failure of the law and
legal institutions to prevent such abuses is, some would argue, consistent with a view
of the law that it is unnecessary, and cannot build trust. I submit that the opposite is
the case. The law’s failure to prevent the subprime mortgage crisis is a reflection of
the fact that it is in precisely such situations that the law is most needed: where the
168

See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Elda Shafir, A One-Size-Fits-All
Solution, N.Y. TIMES, December 26, 2007, at A31 (suggesting standardized, “opt out”
mortgage product as a default mortgage offering to avoid pitfalls of non-conventional and
confusing loan terms).
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ability of trust and trusting relationships to combat predatory behavior has been
weakened.
Can law create trust? Sometimes. Can law make people trustworthy? It
depends.
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